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DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS  
FROM THE FRAMERS TO THE PRESENT 
EUGENE D. MAZO* 
ABSTRACT 
 After years of struggle, we no longer require property ownership, employ poll taxes, or 
force citizens to take literary tests to vote. The franchise is now also open to women, African 
Americans, and other groups that were previously disenfranchised. However, our states still 
prevent citizens from voting if they fail to meet a durational residency requirement. The 
states also impose lengthy durational residency requirements on candidates seeking public 
office. This Article examines the history of America’s durational residency requirements. It 
looks at the debates of the framers at the Constitutional Convention, at how state durational 
residency requirements were broadened in response to migration in the 1800s, and at how 
durational residency requirements were narrowed by the federal government and the Su-
preme Court in the 1970s. The result left a system in which durational residency require-
ments impact voters and candidates differently, and in which these requirements differ at 
the state and federal levels. In most states, durational residency requirements for voters have 
been substantially curtailed, while they remain on the books for candidates. To show how 
this impacts politics, this Article examines several high-profile durational residency contests. 
It also probes whether these requirements may ever be justified in American democracy.  
 
 I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................  612 
 II. A HISTORY OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS .................................  614 
 A. In the Colonies ...........................................................................................  614 
 B. At the Constitutional Convention ..............................................................  616 
 C. In the States ...............................................................................................  625 
 III. THE DEMISE OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTERS ..........  632 
 A. The Federal Challenge ...............................................................................  632 
 B. The Judicial Challenge ..............................................................................  640 
 C. The Modern Durational Residency Requirement ......................................  645 
 IV. THE STABILITY OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
CANDIDATES .....................................................................................................  648 
 A. At the State Level .......................................................................................  650 
 B. At the Federal Level ...................................................................................  663 
 C. Comparing Candidate Residencies ............................................................  666 
 V. THE WISDOM OF DURATIOAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS ................................  669 
 A. Judicial Justifications ...............................................................................  669 
 B. Scholarly Reactions ...................................................................................  671 
 C. Democratic Underpinnings ........................................................................  673 
 VI. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  676 
                                                                                                                  
 * Visiting Professor, Rutgers Law School, Newark, New Jersey. M.A. Harvard; 
Ph.D. Oxford; J.D., Stanford. For comments, I am grateful to the participants of a confer-
ence that was hosted at the Florida State University College of Law—“The Law of Democ-
racy at a Crossroads: Reflecting on Fifty Years of Voting Rights and the Judicial Regula-
tion of the Political Thicket”—and especially to Professor Franita Tolson for inviting me to 
speak at this event on March 27-28, 2015. I also wish to thank Richard Briffault, Paul 
Diller, James Gardner, Richard Hasen, Michael Pitts, Andrew Verstein, and Ronald 
Wright for their very helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. I am indebted to 
Maria Collins and Sam Keenan for research assistance, to Timothy Readling and Caroline 
Young for help with the tables and charts, and to law librarian Liz McCurry Johnson for 
facilitating my numerous research requests. All remaining errors are my own. 
612  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:611 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In American democracy today, most historic restrictions on voting 
have been removed. The states no longer require their citizens to own 
property, pay a poll tax, or take a literary test before they can vote. 
The franchise has also been broadened to include women, African 
Americans, and other groups that were previously disenfranchised. 
Our country’s democratic self-image has long been firmly rooted in 
the belief that the United States has continually expanded suffrage 
for all of its citizens who desire the right to vote. As the Congression-
al Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections explained thirty years ago, 
with only a touch of hyperbole, “[B]y the 200th anniversary of the 
nation the only remaining restrictions [on the franchise] prevented 
voting by the insane, convicted felons and otherwise eligible voters 
who were unable to meet short residence requirements.”1 
 It is well known among scholars that many states disenfranchise 
the mentally unfit, those convicted of felonies, and a third group that 
often goes unmentioned, non-citizen aliens. The reasons these groups 
lack voting rights are rooted in American history. But who consti-
tutes the group of “eligible voters” who are unable to vote because 
they fail to meet “short residence requirements”? It turns out that 
almost every state requires its new citizens to meet a short residence 
requirement before they can vote. Known as a durational residency 
requirement, the states also impose these qualifications on those who 
seek office. This is a phenomenon, however, that has not been ade-
quately studied, and it remains widely under-theorized.  
 Geographical residency is part of democracy. Politicians are elect-
ed from geographical districts, and they represent the people of those 
districts in office. A United States Senator is elected to represent the 
people of his state. A Congressman represents the people of a par-
ticular district in that state. In turn, a citizen from a geographically 
bounded state votes for a Senator who will represent him, just as a 
resident of a geographically bounded district votes for that district’s 
Congressman. No one would seriously advocate for the residents of a 
different state or district to vote for these government officials. What 
is less appreciated is that a new resident of the state who wishes to 
vote for his preferred candidate may often not be able to do so until 
he first meets a durational residency requirement. This means that a 
citizen not only has to reside in a certain geographical district to vote 
for its representatives, but that he must also demonstrate his legal 
residence there for a certain, set period of time.  
                                                                                                                  
 1. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 324 (2d ed. 1985); see also 
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN 
THE UNITED STATES, at xx (rev. ed. 2009) (quoting the Congressional Quarterly and posit-
ing that its statement was made with hyperbole). 
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 Durational residency requirements exist for candidates as well. 
After all, democracy involves not only the right to cast a free vote, but 
also the right to run freely for elected office. Just as voters have to 
satisfy certain durational residency requirements before they can 
cast a ballot in a given state or district, so too do politicians have to 
meet durational residency requirements in most states and munici-
palities before they can run for office.2 The durational residency hur-
dles that political candidates face, however, often look very different 
from those that voters encounter. The durational residency require-
ments for politicians are typically much longer in length, and they 
have not been subject to the same kinds of constitutional challenges 
as those for voters, other than in rare circumstances.  
 As a society, we take durational residency requirements for grant-
ed. Only a few scholars have ever examined durational residency re-
quirements in any serious or systematic way. Even then, most schol-
ars have argued against them.3 Preventing citizens from voting  
because they live in the right district but have not lived there long 
enough is seen as being anti-democratic, while preventing candidates 
who do not meet a durational residency qualification from running 
for office is viewed as little more than an attempt to prevent carpet-
bagging. This, at least, is what the literature on durational residency 
requirements argues.4 Yet states and municipalities have not always 
viewed things this way. Instead, they have advanced many reasons 
for preserving durational residency requirements. When one scratches 
the surface, durational residency requirements turn out to be more 
complicated than they appear. They also have a long history in Amer-
ican jurisprudence, one that dates all the way back to the colonies.  
                                                                                                                  
 2. For some offices, these durational residency requirements can be quite lengthy. 
This is particularly true for state governors. For example, Missouri and Oklahoma’s state 
constitutions require ten years of residency for a governor. See MO. CONST. art. IV, § 3 
(Missouri); OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (Oklahoma). Other states require seven years of resi-
dency. See MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. 2, § 1, art. II (Massachusetts); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 
XLII (New Hampshire); N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 2 (New Jersey); PA. CONST. art.  
IV, § 5 (Pennsylvania); TENN. CONST. art. III, § 3 (Tennessee). Three states require six 
years. See DEL. CONST. art. III, § 6 (Delaware); GA. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. IV (Georgia); 
KY. CONST. § 72 (Kentucky); see also discussion infra Section III.A. 
 3. See, e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Against Residency Requirements, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
341, 341 (2015) (stating that “residency requirements are one aspect of election law that 
does not serve the electorate and should be eliminated as a condition for obtaining and 
holding elected office”); Frederic S. LeClercq, Durational Residency Requirements for Pub-
lic Office, 27 S.C. L. REV. 847, 914 (1976) (“Durational residency requirements for public 
office significantly dilute fundamental rights which deserve, and have received, judicial 
protection: the right to vote, the right of political association and the right to travel. Such 
requirements can and should be invalidated whenever they interfere with the exercise of 
these fundamental constitutional rights.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Pitts, supra note 3, at 353 (explaining how a “possible benefit of residen-
cy requirements . . . is to prevent carpet bagging”).  
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 This Article seeks to examine America’s durational residency re-
quirements in historical and comparative terms. In doing so, it aims 
to make the case that these requirements are not anti-democratic 
and that, in some circumstances, they are both necessary and essen-
tial for democracy. The few scholars who have examined durational 
residency requirements in the past have tried to argue against them, 
but without appreciating their place in our history. This Article seeks 
to blend history and modern law in a way that no one has. It argues 
that durational residency requirements have their place in democrat-
ic politics. Its purpose is to explain the origins of our durational resi-
dency requirements, to chronicle their history, and to probe the con-
tours of when they may be justified in American democracy.  
 There are various kinds of durational residency requirements. 
They differ from one another in terms of their length, how they are 
imposed, and whom they affect. There are also different policies be-
hind them. Perhaps the greatest distinctions among durational resi-
dency requirements concern whom they affect: voters or candidates. 
At one time, the durational residency requirements for voters were 
extensive, yet they have in recent years been severely curtailed. 
Meanwhile, the residency qualifications for political candidates, at 
least in the individual states, often remain lengthy to this day.  
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part II examines the history of 
our durational residency requirements, going all the way back to the 
colonies and the Constitutional Convention. Part III focuses on dura-
tional residency requirements for voters. It explains how these quali-
fications blossomed in the states in the 1800s before being severely 
narrowed by Congress and by the Supreme Court in the 1970s. Part 
IV turns to an examination of durational residency requirements for 
candidates. It highlights the mismatch that exists between the state 
level, where durational residency requirements persist, and the fed-
eral level, where durational residency requirements do not exist. It 
also examines several high-profile residency challenges, including 
those faced by Rahm Emanuel when he ran for mayor of Chicago, by 
Zephyr Teachout when she challenged Andrew Cuomo in the Demo-
cratic primary for governor of New York, and by Hillary Clinton 
when she ran for the Senate from New York. Part V examines the 
democratic justifications for durational residency requirements.  
II.   A HISTORY OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS 
A.   In the Colonies 
 The requirement that a person has to live in a state for a certain 
period of time before he can participate in the democratic process is 
so ingrained in the American psyche that most of us fail to question 
it. Durational residency requirements have a long history that can be 
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traced back to before the time of the country’s founding. Indeed, 
these requirements were enshrined in many of our founding docu-
ments, including in many state constitutions. They were also hotly 
debated by the framers at the Constitutional Convention.  
 For more than a decade before the framers of the Constitution met 
in Philadelphia, the colonies had crafted their own unique voting 
rules. These laws were largely shaped by the knowledge that the col-
onists had of how representation worked in England.5 The English 
system of democracy was initially designed to represent land. As Pro-
fessor James Gardner explains, in feudal England landholders held 
estates under the condition that they would provide financial assis-
tance to the crown.6 Only those who owned land could be summoned 
to Parliament for the purpose of giving their consent to being taxed 
by the King. As the rise of commerce expanded, the English mon-
archs decided that it would be in their interest to invite representa-
tives of various town and boroughs, where merchant wealth was lo-
cated, to join them in Parliament. However, the system under which 
Parliament represented a taxed unit of land persisted.7 
 The English model was eventually adopted in the American colo-
nies, where new colonial legislatures also initially allocated their 
seats to territorial units. In Massachusetts, the representatives who 
held seats in the colonial legislature represented towns; in Virginia, 
they represented plantations; and in South Carolina, they represent-
ed parishes.8 By the time of the American Revolution, the Founding 
Fathers were familiar with this territorial system of representation 
and fully accepted it.9 This is why only property owners, most of 
whom happened to be white and male, had the right to vote. Property 
owners were thought to have a “stake in society.”10 Like their English 
forbearers, they were considered to be committed members of the 
community with a vested interest in public policy, especially regard-
ing matters of taxation.11 Those who owned land were thought to 
have sufficient independence to make their own sound judgment on 
matters of governance.12 The idea that some men were in “so mean a 
situation” that they “had no will of their own,” a phrase attributed to 
Blackstone, was heard often during the Founding Era and applied to 
                                                                                                                  
 5. See KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 4. 
 6. James A. Gardner, Partitioning and Rights: The Supreme Court’s Accidental Ju-
risprudence of Democratic Process, 42 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 61, 66-67 (2014).  
 7. Id. at 67. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 68. 
 10. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 4. 
 11. Id. at 4-5. 
 12. Id. at 5. 
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those who did not own land.13 The colonists believed that the fran-
chise should not extend to such persons. The fact that only landown-
ers could vote was a natural consequence of this view.  
 During the Founding Era, suffrage was treated as a state consti-
tutional issue. In all of the states, apart from one, the rules of voting 
were found in state constitutions, and not, as they would be hundreds 
of years later, in statutes or municipal codes. Early state constitu-
tions were replete with durational residency requirements, not only 
for voting but also for seeking public office.14 In many of the colonies, 
political candidates for office had to prove that they resided in the 
colony for a certain number of years before they could seek election.15 
Since the colonies were independent from one another, each sought to 
restrict its political community to those who held a true interest in 
the colony’s affairs. A clause addressing each state’s durational resi-
dency requirements was a common feature in state constitutions of 
the era, and it helped accomplish this goal. State durational residen-
cy requirements would later become more controversial, but early on, 
they were deeply rooted in the American colonial experience.16 
B.   At the Constitutional Convention 
 The records and debates of the Constitutional Convention provide 
us with some insight into what our Founding Fathers thought of du-
rational residency requirements. During the debates that took place 
in Philadelphia in 1787, three distinct justifications were advanced 
for why these requirements were needed.17 The first was to assure 
that candidates were knowledgeable about local matters.18 The sec-
ond was to prevent wealthy foreign nations from sending over emis-
saries to the United States and having them purchase their way to 
public office.19 The third was to discourage wealthy men from neigh-
boring states from seeking public office elsewhere after they had 
failed to secure election in their own state.20 This last practice was 
                                                                                                                  
 13. Id. at 9. 
 14. See Frederic S. LeClercq, The Emerging Federally Secured Right of Political Par-
ticipation, 8 IND. L. REV. 607, 612-13 (1975). 
 15. See id. at 613.  
 16. See, e.g., A. MCKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH 
COLONIES IN AMERICA 135-36 (1905) (explaining that South Carolina imposed a durational 
residency requirement on suffrage as early as 1693).  
 17. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 216-19, 235-39 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. 
 18. Id. at 216 (George Mason of Virginia); id. at 217 (John Rutledge of South Carolina). 
 19. Id. at 216 (George Mason of Virginia) (“It might also happen that a rich foreign 
Nation, for example Great Britain, might send over her tools who might bribe their way 
into the Legislature for insidious purposes.”).  
 20. Id. at 218 (George Mason of Virginia). 
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known to be “the practice in the boroughs of England,”21 and it was 
part of what led to that country’s “rotten borough” system. England’s 
boroughs were infamous for sending representatives to Parliament 
from districts that had few remaining residents. These “rotten bor-
oughs” also sometimes elected wealthy non-residents to office who 
secured a seat in Parliament from neighboring or even isolated dis-
tricts.22 The Founding Fathers abhorred this practice, which they be-
lieved turned democratic representation into an illusion.23  
 The Founding Fathers understood that durational residency re-
quirements applied separately to candidates and voters. But their 
debates concerned only how these rules applied to candidates. A 
complicated patchwork of state suffrage rules had proliferated in the 
individual states by the time the framers met in Philadelphia in 
1787. This patchwork, as Virginia’s delegate James Wilson ex-
plained, made it “difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications 
[for voting] for all the states.”24 For the men who came together to 
write the new Constitution, voting was thought to be a state issue. 
Though not all of the framers held this view, many did. These men 
believed that questions regarding who got to vote should be left to the 
states, rather than dictated by the federal government.25  
 In Philadelphia, some delegates wanted the rules for voting to be 
regulated by the Constitution. Other delegates insisted that this was 
a matter best left to the states. A compromise had to be reached be-
tween the conflicting views. In the end, the new Constitution forged a 
link between the suffrage rules of the states and the right to vote in 
federal elections by allowing only those people in each state who had 
met the qualifications to vote for the “most numerous Branch of 
the[ir] state legislature” to vote for the members of the new House of 
                                                                                                                  
 21. Id. 
 22. See LeClercq, supra note 3, at 852 n.23; see also generally JOHN CANNON, 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM, 1640-1832 (1972); EDWARD PORRITT, THE UNREFORMED HOUSE 
OF COMMONS: PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION BEFORE 1832 (1903). 
 23. See LeClercq, supra note 3, at 852 n.23 (quoting G. Campion, Parliament, 17. 
ENCY. BRITANNICA 316 (1958)). 
 24. See KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 18; see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: 
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 82, 224-25 (1997).  
 25. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 249 (John 
Rutledge of South Carolina) (“observing, that the Committee [on Detail] had reported no 
qualifications [should be included in the Constitution for membership in Congress] because 
they could not agree on any among themselves”); id. (Oliver Elseworth of Connecticut) 
(“The different circumstances of different parts of the U.S. and the probable difference 
between the present and future circumstances of the whole, render it improper to have 
either uniform or fixed qualifications. Make them so high as to be useful in the S. States, 
and they will be inapplicable to the E. States. Suit them to the latter, and they will serve 
no purpose in the former. . . . [I]t was better to leave this matter to the Legislative discre-
tion than to attempt a provision for it in the Constitution.”). 
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Representatives.26 The U.S. House would become the only institution 
for which the Constitution demanded a popular electoral process of 
any kind.27 Again, this was because of the need to placate the dele-
gates who saw voting as a state issue. Whether a durational residen-
cy requirement applied to a person voting for the member of the U.S. 
House would ultimately be determined by the law of his state.28 
 However, the question of whether a political candidate seeking to 
become a member of the U.S. House should have to meet a durational 
residency requirement in the state from which he was being elected 
remained contested, and was hotly debated. This debate centered 
around how the country’s new Constitution would guarantee mobility 
while protecting local interests. Questions concerning how durational 
residency requirements applied to political candidates were often in-
tertwined in the minds of the framers with questions concerning a 
candidate’s citizenship. On Wednesday, August 8, 1787, at the Con-
stitutional Convention,29 George Mason of Virginia explained that he 
“was for opening a wide door for emigrants; but did not chuse [sic] to 
let foreigners and adventurers make laws for us & govern us.”30 For 
this reason, the delegates suggested that a three-year citizenship re-
quirement should be imposed on members of the new House of Rep-
resentatives. George Mason, however, proposed that a member of the 
House of Representatives should have to be a citizen for seven years 
before his election, not three years.31 
 The seven-year citizenship requirement passed without objection, 
with every state but one agreeing to it.32 But when the next part of 
the clause governing the requirements of electing the members of the 
House of Representatives was debated—it originally stated that eve-
ry member “shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the 
State in which he shall be chosen”33—consensus quickly broke down. 
                                                                                                                  
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in 
each state shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch 
of the State Legislature.”); see also KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 18. 
 27. See KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 18. 
 28. See id. 
 29. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 213-19. 
 30. Id. at 216 (George Mason of Virginia). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Connecticut was the one exception. See id.  
 33. Id. at 216 n.3 (emphasis added). Originally the draft read:  
Article IV, Sect. 2. “Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of 
the age of twenty five years at least; shall have been a citizen of the United 
States for at least three years before his election; and shall be, at the time of 
his election, a resident of the State to which he shall be chosen.”  
See id. The three-year citizenship requirement was changed to “seven.” Id. at 216. The word 
resident was changed to “inhabitant” after a somewhat lengthier debate. Id. at 216-18. 
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Roger Sherman of Connecticut argued that the word “resident” 
should be substituted by the word “inhabitant.”34 Madison found both 
terms vague, but he believed that at least the latter “would not ex-
clude persons absent occasionally for a considerable time on public or 
private business” from holding office.35 Gouverneur Morris was op-
posed to both terms. Imposing “[s]uch a regulation is not necessary,” 
Morris argued, because “[p]eople rarely chuse [sic] a nonresident.”36 
“Resident” had a certain meaning to the framers based on their un-
derstanding of residency requirements in the states. That meaning 
was tied to the legal period of time a person had to live in a state. 
 Some delegates continued to argue that a durational residency 
requirement for candidates should appear in the Constitution. John 
Rutledge of South Carolina, for instance, urged his fellow delegates 
to include a provision stating “that a residence of 7 years [should] be 
required in the State Wherein the Member [should] be elected.”37 
This ensured knowledgeable candidates for public office. “An emi-
grant from [New] England to [South Carolina] or Georgia would 
know little of its affairs,” Rutledge told the others, “and could not be 
supposed to acquire a thorough knowledge in less time.”38 George 
Mason agreed with him. “I am in favor of Residency—if you do not 
require it—a rich man may send down to the Districts of a state in 
[which] he does not reside and purchase an Election for his [Depend-
ent],” Mason explained.39 “This is the practice in the boroughs of Eng-
land.”40 Other delegates agreed with the need for a durational resi-
dency requirement, but they urged a much shorter term. Oliver Ells-
worth of Connecticut thought requiring seven years of residency was 
too much. He suggested that one year would be sufficient, though he 
also stated that he had no objection to making it three years.41  
 The arguments of those who opposed the residency requirement 
ultimately won out. John Mercer of Maryland argued that the dura-
tional residency requirement would discourage men who had once 
been inhabitants of a state, but had since moved elsewhere, from re-
turning.42 He believed that such a regulation would create “greater 
alienship among the States than existed under the old federal sys-
                                                                                                                  
 34. Id. at 216. 
 35. Id. at 217. 
 36. Id. (Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania). 
 37. Id. (John Rutledge of South Carolina); id. at 225 (Notes of Rufus King of Massa-
chusetts) (explaining that Mr. Rutledge wanted the clause to require one to be a “[r]esident 
for seven years in the State where he is elected”). 
 38. Id. (John Rutledge of South Carolina). 
 39. Id. at 225 (Notes of Rufus King of New York). 
 40. Id. at 218 (George Mason of Virginia). 
 41. Id. at 217-18 (Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut). 
 42. Id. at 217 (John Francis Mercer of Maryland). 
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tem” of the Articles of Confederation, and that it would “interweave 
local prejudices & State distinctions in the very Constitution which is 
meant to cure them.”43 At the end of the day, the proposal for requir-
ing a member of the House of Representatives to satisfy a three-year 
durational residency requirement in the state from which he was 
elected was defeated by a vote of nine to two.44 The proposal for a 
one-year durational residency requirement was also defeated, this 
time six to four.45 The view prevailed on the majority of the delegates 
that durational residency requirements did not belong in the federal 
Constitution: “[W]e are now forming a National Government,” George 
Read of Delaware reminded his colleagues, “and such a regulation 
would correspond little with the idea that we are one people.”46 
 Similar controversies over a durational residency requirement 
took place the next day, on August 9, 1787, when the qualifications 
for serving in the United States Senate were debated. Members of 
the Senate were originally to be chosen by their state legislatures.47 
(It was only 125 years later, after the Seventeenth Amendment was 
ratified in 1913, that U.S. Senators became popularly elected.48) But 
not all of the framers trusted the state legislatures to select a proper 
candidate, and some argued that a durational residency requirement, 
or at least a citizenship requirement, should be imposed. After fer-
vent debate, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention agreed 
that a citizenship requirement would have to be met: members of the 
House already had to be citizens for seven years,49 and a debate en-
sued over how long the qualification for Senators should be. Arguing 
against “the danger of admitting strangers into our public Councils,” 
Gouverneur Morris insisted on a time period of fourteen years.50 
                                                                                                                  
 43. Id. (John Francis Mercer of Maryland).  
 44. Id. at 219. Only Georgia and South Carolina were in favor of the three-year  
requirement.  
 45. Id. Georgia, South Carolina, New Jersey, and North Carolina voted for the one-
year requirement; see also id. at 225 (Notes of Rufus King) (“[A] question was put & nega-
tived by 8 of 11 states to insert Inhabitant for 3 yrs. – afterwards the question for One yr. 
before Election was negatived by 6 of 11 . . . .”); id. at 226 (Notes of James McHenry of 
Maryland) (“It was proposed to add to the section ‘at least one year preceding his election’ 
[but this requirement for a member of the House was] negatived.”). 
 46. Id. at 217 (George Read of Delaware). 
 47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be com-
posed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years . . . .”). 
 48. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed 
of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years . . . . The elec-
tors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous 
branch of the State legislatures.”). 
 49. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall 
not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the 
United States . . . .”). 
 50. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 235 (Gouverneur 
Morris of Pennsylvania). 
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Charles Pinkney of South Carolina seconded this motion, adding that 
because “the Senate is to have the power of making treaties & man-
aging our foreign affairs, there is peculiar danger and impropriety in 
opening its door to those who have foreign attachments.”51 George 
Mason suggested that membership in the new Senate might even be 
restricted to the native-born.52 
 During a vigorous debate, other delegates opposed these re-
strictions. Some, such as Oliver Ellsworth, saw them as “discourag-
ing meritorious aliens from emigrating to this Country.”53 Benjamin 
Franklin was also against any durational residency or citizenship 
requirement. He tried to persuade his colleagues that the United 
States had many friends and allies in Europe, adding, “We found in 
the Course of the Revolution, that many strangers served us faithful-
ly – and that many natives took part [against] their Country.”54 
Franklin’s view was that when “foreigners after looking about for 
some other Country in which they can obtain more happiness, give a 
preference to ours, it is a proof of attachment which ought to excite 
our confidence & affection.”55 He saw the fourteen-year citizenship 
proposal as an “illiberality inserted in the Constitution.”56 
 Edmund Randolph of Virginia similarly argued that it would be 
unwise to prevent immigrants from participating in the public life of 
their new country for a period of fourteen years.57 And James Wilson, 
who was born in Scotland, pointed to the irony that, under the pro-
posed rules, he would not be able to hold office under the very Consti-
tution that he had a hand in making. Wilson told his colleagues of 
how, when he arrived in Maryland, he found himself “from defect of 
residence, under certain legal incapacities, which never ceased to 
produce chagrin,” even when he “did not desire . . . the offices to 
which they related.”58 To be incapable of being appointed to an office 
in one’s country was “a circumstance grating, and mortifying.”59 Like 
Benjamin Franklin, James Madison also considered such a “re-
striction . . . in the Constitution unnecessary, and improper.”60 It was 
                                                                                                                  
 51. Id. (Charles Pinkney of South Carolina). 
 52. Id. (George Mason of Virginia) (“Were it not that many not natives of this Country 
had acquired great merit during the revolution, he should be for restraining the eligibility 
into the Senate, to natives.”). 
 53. Id. (Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut). 
 54. Id. at 236 (Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania). 
 55. Id. at 236-37 (Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania). 
 56. Id. at 236 (Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania). 
 57. Id. at 237 (Edmund Randolph of Virginia). 
 58. Id. (James Wilson of Pennsylvania). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 235 (James Madison of Virginia). 
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unnecessary because Congress had already been given the power to 
regulate the rules for naturalization. It was improper because it 
would give “a tincture of illiberality to the Constitution.”61 
 The idea of a fourteen-year citizenship requirement was ultimate-
ly defeated by a vote of seven to four. Periods of thirteen and ten 
years, respectively, were proposed and were also defeated at the Con-
stitutional Convention.62 To compromise, Edmund Randolph pro-
posed that a period of seven years be considered, but John Rutledge 
countered by saying that since a period of seven years had been pro-
posed for the House, a longer timeframe was required for the Senate, 
which would have more power. Randolph thus proposed a nine-year 
period. The motion to require Senators to be citizens for nine years 
passed by a vote of six to four. Less controversially, the requirement 
that a Senator be a “Resident” of his state when elected was replaced 
with the requirement that he be an “Inhabitant” of that state.63 This, 
again, was done to avoid squabbling over the eligibility for holding 
federal office and to defeat efforts to adopt state durational residency 
requirements for members of the House and Senate.64 
  The delegates could not agree over whether to impose durational 
residency requirements on federal officeholders, and compromises 
had to be made to move forward. One of those compromises was that 
a durational citizenship requirement was imposed on the four elected 
offices listed in the Constitution: Representative, Senator, Vice Pres-
ident, and President.65 Each person who held one of these offices 
would be required to hold United States citizenship for a certain 
number of years. Although the debate over this requirement was 
closely tied in the minds of the framers to their debates over dura-
tional residency requirements, there were also important differences. 
The durational citizenship requirements that the framers wrote into 
the Constitution did not foreclose the possibility of an individual with 
political aspirations for holding federal office from moving to a new 
state.66 By contrast, a lengthy durational residency requirement 
would have surely put up barriers to a newcomer who was looking to 
run for office in a state that was not originally his own. 
 The framers’ decision to link national suffrage to state suffrage 
laws meant that durational residency requirements would be pre-
served for the nation’s new voters, given that these requirements al-
                                                                                                                  
 61. Id. at 235-36 (James Madison of Virginia). 
 62. Id. at 230. 
 63. Id. at 239. 
 64. See LeClercq, supra note 3, at 854. 
 65. See Derek Muller, Scrutinizing Federal Electoral Qualifications, 90 IND. L.J. 559, 
563 (2015) (noting there were four elected offices listed in the Constitution: President, Vice 
President, Senator, and Representative).  
 66. Id. at 563-72. 
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ready existed in most states. Durational residency requirements 
would also be preserved for candidates seeking state office, but they 
would not apply to those seeking federal office. This early divergence 
between state and federal practice concerning durational residency 
requirements would influence the political landscape for the next two 
hundred years. There was only one exception to this durational resi-
dency mismatch, and it concerned the offices of the President and 
Vice President. The new Constitution of 1787 called for a complex 
system of choosing “electors” in each state, who would cast ballots to 
fill these two offices. The electors’ ballots were to be sent to Congress 
to count. The candidate who received the most ballots would become 
President, and the candidate with the second-most Vice President.67 
The Constitution left it up to the legislatures of the states, however, 
to determine how these electors would be chosen, specifying only the 
number that each state was allotted.68 However, not everyone was 
eligible to be President: the Constitution designated both a citizen-
ship and a durational residency requirement for that office.  
 When the delegates met on August 22, 1787, exactly two weeks 
after they had decided not to impose a durational residency require-
ment on candidates for the new Congress, they inserted language in-
to their constitutional draft requiring that the country’s new Presi-
dent be “a Citizen of the United States, and shall have been an In-
habitant thereof for Twenty one years.”69 It is not evident from the 
delegates’ notes when this clause was debated.70 However, by Sep-
tember 4, when the delegates discussed how the electors’ votes would 
be counted, this language was changed to say that a person could not 
be elected to the office of President “who has not been in the whole, at 
least 14 years a resident within the U.S.”71 The framers retained this 
fourteen-year requirement, and the Constitution, as ratified, speci-
fied that no person could be President unless he “[has] been fourteen 
Years a Resident within the United States.”72 The citizenship re-
                                                                                                                  
 67. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
164-69 (1913) (chronicling the debates of the framers about how the new President of the 
United States would be elected). 
 68. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Sena-
tors and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”). 
 69. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 367. 
 70. See id. at 369-79 (Journal of Mr. James Madison and Mr. James McHenry for 
August 22, 1787).  
 71. Id. at 494 (emphasis added). 
 72. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citi-
zen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible 
to the Office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not 
have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the 
United States”) (emphasis added); see also Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the 
United States: The Unresolved Enigma, 28 MD. L. REV. 1 (1968); Jordan Steiker, Sanford 
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quirement was also strengthened, so that the President now not only 
had to be “a Citizen of the United States,” but also could not serve 
unless he was actually “a natural born Citizen.”73  
 When the Twelfth Amendment was ratified in 1804, it changed 
the way the electors selected the President and Vice President. That 
Amendment added that “no person constitutionally ineligible to the 
office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the 
United States.”74 This meant that the fourteen-year durational re-
quirement for President would now apply to the office of the Vice 
President as well. At the federal level today, these are the only two 
offices for which a durational residency requirement is mandated. 
But this durational qualification, it is again important to note, is dif-
ferent from the state requirements, for it does not restrict a candi-
date from moving among the states or around the country.  
 By contrast, the Constitution does not impose a durational resi-
dency requirement for the House or Senate. It only requires that a 
representative for the House from any state be “an Inhabitant of that 
State” at the time “when elected.”75 A similar requirement applies to 
candidates for the U.S. Senate.76 Beyond these requirements, the Su-
preme Court has held that the states do not have the power to add 
additional qualifications for federal candidates.77 However, most 
states have the power to impose such requirements on their own 
state officials. As such, durational residency rules at the state and 
municipal level became common. Many states imposed some form of 
a durational residency requirement on their elected state officials, 
including their governors, legislators, judges, and mayors. Equally, 
they imposed durational residency requirements on their voters.  
                                                                                                                  
Levinson & J. M. Balkin, Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Inter-
pretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1995). 
 73. Compare 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 367, with id. 
at 494; and U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen . . . shall 
be eligible to the Office of President.”) (emphasis added). 
 74. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 75. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Indeed, there have been times in American history 
when a candidate elected to federal office happened to be an inhabitant of another state 
immediately before his election. See, e.g., Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 
589 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting one instance when an elected representative actually moved 
into his new state of residence two weeks before his election). 
 76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No person shall be a Senator . . . who shall not, when 
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”).  
 77. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that 
states have no power to add electoral qualifications for candidates to federal offices beyond 
those enumerated in the Constitution); Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.M. 1972) 
(holding additional state two-year residency requirement imposed by the state of New Mex-
ico for a federal candidate to be unconstitutional).  
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C.   In the States 
 The laws governing the right to vote, according to Professor Alex-
ander Keyssar, were “elaborated and significantly transformed” 
throughout the country between 1790 and 1850.78 Many of the indi-
vidual states held constitutional conventions during this time, some-
times more than once. How political power would be allocated in the 
young but quickly growing republic became a subject of intense de-
bate in many state and local communities. Among other things, even 
the physical act of voting began to take a different shape. At the time 
of the founding, according to Professor Keyssar, the procedures used 
for voting differed “from state to state and even from town to town.”79 
In some counties, voting had been an oral act. Men assembled before 
election judges and cast their vote when their name was called.80 In 
other counties, voting took place through written ballots. These were 
at first printed by political parties, but as abuses arose and vote rig-
ging became more commonplace, the states eventually took over the 
printing of election ballots and running of elections.81 
 As the states began to play an increasingly dominant role in elec-
tions, new laws developed to govern these contests. Suddenly, states 
had to define what it meant to be a “resident” or “inhabitant,” how 
one satisfied this requirement, and what documents a voter had to 
show to prove his citizenship and residency qualifications before cast-
ing his ballot.82 The states also had to develop the administrative ca-
pacity to deal with running elections, not to mention the judicial abil-
ity to resolve election disputes. At the time of the Revolution, proper-
ty ownership had nearly universally been a qualification for suffrage. 
But by 1790, this requirement that only freeholders could vote began 
being dismantled.83 Sometimes the property qualification was re-
placed with other economic qualifications for suffrage.84  
 The gradual elimination of property qualifications for voting did 
not mean that all economic qualifications were eliminated. Rather, as 
the right to vote expanded in the nineteenth century, poll taxes and 
other economic qualifications would be substituted, often in perni-
cious ways, to restrict the franchise. Still, the demise of the property 
qualification was significant. It meant that society no longer thought 
voters needed “Blackstonian independence”85 to exercise the right to 
                                                                                                                  
 78. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 23. 
 79. Id. at 23-24. 
 80. Id. at 24. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 25.  
 85. Id.  
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vote, and it meant that individual states could no longer restrict the 
franchise to a small, select group of men. Soon people would find that 
they did not have to put down roots in order to vote, or at least the 
kind of deep roots that property ownership signified.  
 Out of fear that the polls would be open to a large number of va-
grants and migratory individuals, the states increasingly began to 
turn to durational residency rules to define and control their elec-
torates. To be sure, some states welcomed newly eligible voters, and 
many passed legislation making it easier for those from the poorer 
classes who did not own land, and who were previously disenfran-
chised, to vote. Yet in many states, durational residency require-
ments were designed to prevent migrants from voting or from influ-
encing the composition and functioning of the government in a place 
where they were temporarily located and did not intend to stay. As 
durational residency requirements were refined by state govern-
ments, local municipalities often copied what happened in state capi-
tals, moving to match the new state-mandated requirements. 
 Where state governments played with their residency rules, the 
tinkering depended on whether the state was in need of new workers 
and new labor, or whether, instead, it wanted to keep newcomers out. 
Delaware, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Indiana, and Michigan 
shortened their durational residency requirements.86 Some states 
that were in need of more people, particularly those in the Midwest, 
not only relaxed their durational residency requirements but also 
even went as far as to extend the franchise to non-citizen aliens.87 By 
the 1830s, most state governments had rules regulating their dura-
tional residency requirements for voting. What the proper length for 
these rules should be was often the subject of heated debate.88 Ac-
cording to Professor Keyssar, the average length of a state durational 
residency requirement for a new voter was one year in the state and 
three to six months in his town or county.89 But the length also varied 
by region, usually depending on whether the political entity in ques-
tion wanted to welcome newcomers to its borders or not.  
 When newcomers were desired, durational residency requirements 
were shortened. Extending the suffrage to new arrivals encouraged 
migration. Especially in the newly settled states of the Midwest, 
where labor was in demand, short durational residency requirements 
became the norm. On the other hand, in many of the states located 
along the eastern seaboard, where immigrants were plentiful and 
where they increasingly settled in urban areas with large popula-
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 88. Id. at 51. 
 89. Id. at 51-52. 
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tions, longer durational residency requirements became much more 
commonplace. Table 1, which is based on calculations originally made 
by Professor Keyssar, illustrates the residency requirements that ex-
isted in each state between 1870 and 1923.90  
 In addition to regulating the duration of their residencies, states 
also attempted to define who qualified to be a “resident” for purposes 
of voting. A number of states attempted to regulate their suffrage 
rules by preventing certain classes of inhabitants from qualifying for 
residency status entirely, regardless of their duration in the state. 
For instance, military personnel who happened to be locally stationed 
were excluded from voting by a number of the states.91 Between 1850 
and 1900, more than thirty states included a provision in their state 
constitutions that prevented voting rights from being extended to  
resident soldiers temporarily stationed within the state’s borders.92 
Oklahoma added this requirement to its state constitution in 1907, 
Michigan did so in 1908, and Arizona followed suit in 1910. The goal 
of these provisions was to prevent transients from influencing  
a community. Not until 1965, when the Supreme Court decided  








                                                                                                                  
 90. Table 1 is based on information originally gathered in ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE 
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 In the 1890s, durational residency requirements were also used in 
the Southern states—along with poll taxes and literacy tests—to dis-
enfranchise African Americans, whom many southern whites unfair-
ly considered to be “nomadic.”94 African Americans often had a harder 
time proving their residency and the length of their stay in a certain 
area, and durational residency requirements were used to discrimi-
nate against them.95 Wherever they existed, state durational residen-
cy qualifications penalized mobility and reinforced parochial perspec-
tives. In the South, where states had a special affection for long resi-
dency requirements, their length served “to promote [the] acquies-
cence of public officeholders to the status quo interests of a slave-
owning . . . society.”96 In 1875, Alabama increased the length of its 
state residency requirement for voting from sixth months to one year; 
in 1901, it increased it to two years. North Carolina increased its re-
quirement to two years in 1876. Mississippi followed suit in 1890, 
South Carolina in 1895, Louisiana in 1898, and Virginia in 1902.97 
 By the turn of the twentieth century, durational residency re-
quirements were commonplace in most of the states. The prevalence 
of these laws suggests that they played an important role in many 
states. One scholar has argued that the proliferation of these re-
quirements “reflect[ed] xenophobic tendencies” and that they were 
“out of spirit with the idea of [a] national union.”98 But this view is 
probably extreme. Though it is hard to doubt that, in many instances, 
states increased the length of their durational residency require-
ments when they wanted to make it harder for outsiders to settle 
within their borders, it may also be the case that mandating a dura-
tional period of residence before giving one the vote resulted from 
inertia. In the meantime, county, township, district, and precinct du-
rational residency requirements patterned themselves after the state 
models. American society was not especially mobile at this time, and 
those who picked up and moved to a different state comprised a small 
percentage of the country’s growing population. As such, it is likely 
that the lengthy durational residency requirements that existed in 
the 1800s reflected the negative attitude of some communities in the 
country toward newcomers, outsiders, and mobility.  
                                                                                                                  
 94. See KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 89. 
 95. Id. at 88-90. 
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III.   THE DEMISE OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY  
REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTERS 
 Durational residency requirements are not a monolithic phenom-
enon. Both in theory and in practice, it is important to distinguish 
between two different types of durational residency requirements. 
The first is the one the framers wrestled with at the time of the Con-
stitutional Convention: their debates concerned whether a residency 
requirement should be imposed on political candidates and those 
seeking to hold public office. The second type of durational residency 
requirement concerns those seeking to cast a ballot—in other words, 
voters. These two types of durational residency requirements are 
conceptually distinct and deserve to be analyzed separately.99  
 Most states impose durational residency requirements on both 
voters and political candidates, but the individuals affected, the peri-
od of duration required, and the justifications given for each of these 
distinct durational residency requirements differ significantly. As the 
democratic theorist Robert Dahl has explained, democracy involves 
both the freedom to vote and the freedom to run for office.100 It thus 
makes sense that the durational residency requirements enacted by 
the states would target each activity separately. For decades, lengthy 
durational residency requirements existed for both voters and candi-
dates in the states. However, in the 1970s, the durational residency 
requirements for voters began to be extensively cut back. This Part 
examines what happened to the durational residency requirements 
that the states imposed on voters and how they were curtailed. 
A.   The Federal Challenge 
 All states had some kind of durational residency qualifications 
that they maintained by the 1930s and 1940s. These usually restrict-
ed voting for a new resident until the person lived in the state for one 
year, although there were cases where the durational period was 
both longer and shorter. In rural areas and in the Midwest, the resi-
dency period was often only six months. The state constitutions of 
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, and Oregon all required on-
ly a six-month residency for suffrage. Indiana and South Dakota also 
required six months of residency, although it had to be preceded by a 
                                                                                                                  
 99. But see Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (explaining that “the rights of 
voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that 
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year’s residency in the United States. In many southern states and in 
Rhode Island, the durational requirement was two years.101  
 There were also important exceptions to these durational residen-
cy requirements. One important exception applied to those serving 
overseas. When servicemen could not be around to satisfy a dura-
tional residency requirement, absentee voting laws had to be fash-
ioned to account for this. Before the Civil War, absentee voting was 
rare. As the United States became entangled in overseas conflicts, 
however, and men who were serving their country could not return 
home to vote in its elections, absentee voting became more promi-
nent.102 During World War I, nearly three million men were sent 
overseas. Their absence meant these voters could not satisfy the long 
durational residency requirements that some of their states imposed. 
As a result, by 1918, nearly all of the states crafted provisions to ex-
empt servicemen from durational residency requirements during 
times of war.103 The exceptions created for servicemen eventually be-
gan to be applied to other kinds of workers, including those who had 
to be absent from their state on official government business.104  
 Until World War II, durational requirements spanning months 
and even years continued to be an accepted prerequisite to voter reg-
istration. Multiple factors—including the limited textual support for 
the right to vote in the Constitution, and the relatively small levels of 
interstate migration—ensured that there was little opposition to 
these laws. However, the sharp increase in interstate travel and mi-
gration that followed World War II, combined with the Supreme 
Court’s interest in protecting the right to vote during the Warren 
Court era, soon put durational residency qualifications on the na-
tional agenda, in the crosshairs of Congress, and on court dockets.  
 As voting rights cases made their way to the Supreme Court in 
the 1960s, voting rights issues began to seep deeper into the Ameri-
can consciousness. The large number of citizens who were ineligible 
to vote because of a state’s durational residency requirement soon 
began to draw the public’s attention.105 To respond to pubic pressure, 
                                                                                                                  
 101. See KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 183, 352.  
 102. Id. at 122. 
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many state legislatures adopted “return-to-vote” legislation. These 
laws were designed to make it easier for residents who relocated 
within the state’s borders to vote, often by lowering precinct or coun-
ty durational residency rules or else providing a way for residents 
who had moved to a different county within the same state to cast a 
ballot in their old precincts.106 These rules lacked uniformity from 
state to state, and they also did little to solve issues facing interstate 
movers. Although many people during this time felt that the status of 
durational residency requirements for voting should remain a states’ 
rights issue, pressure also began mounting for Congress to enter the 
fray and play a much larger national role in these matters.107 
 By the 1960s, in most states, a one-year durational residency re-
quirement had become the norm. A survey conducted in 1962 found 
that a one-year residency was required by 34 states. In another 
twelve states, the in-state residency period was six months. In four 
states, it was two years.108 The impact of these laws on an American 
society that had become increasingly more mobile was starting to 
take its toll. In every decade since 1900, geographic mobility in the 
United States had steadily increased. Nonetheless, durational resi-
dency rules continued to impede voting for many of those who may 
have desired to exercise this right. In the early 1960s, a study com-
missioned by the American Heritage Foundation examined the caus-
es of nonvoting in presidential and congressional elections. It found 
that of the country’s 104 million voting-age citizens in 1960, eight 
million were adults who had recently moved and were disqualified 
from voting by state, county, and precinct durational residency re-
quirements.109 In 1964, according to another source, durational resi-
dency laws prevented fifteen million people from voting.110  
 Congress soon realized that it had to take action. Under the Con-
stitution, the states set “[t]he [t]imes, [p]laces, and [m]anner” of hold-
ing elections for federal officials.111 But Congress has the power, un-
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 109. Id.  
 110. See KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 223 (citing The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 107 n.21 (1972)).  
 111. See U.S. CONST. art, I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
2016]  RESIDENCY AND DEMOCRACY 635 
 
der Article I, Section 4, to pass a federal law “at any time” that could 
alter the rules set by the states.112 In 1970, Congress sought to regu-
late durational residency requirements when it passed its first 
amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.113 Aimed at ending the 
system of mass disenfranchisement that had kept many African 
Americans from the polls, particularly in the southern states, the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 was one of President Lyndon Johnson’s 
greatest legislative achievements. The law would become so monu-
mental that scholars would later come to view it as a “sacred symbol” 
of American democracy.114 But not all sections of the original Voting 
Rights Act were permanent. Given the unprecedented scope of feder-
al power that was granted by this statute, President Johnson and 
Congress decided to make some of its most far-reaching provisions 
temporary.115 Section 5 of the VRA, which required all of the states in 
the South to seek federal “preclearance” for any changes made in 
their voting practices or procedures, came with a sunset provision.116 
 In 1965, Congress had designed Section 5 to ensure that voting 
changes in “covered jurisdictions,” which encompassed all of the 
states of the Deep South, could not be implemented until a favorable 
determination has been made by the U.S. Attorney General or the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia that minority voting 
rights were not being negatively affected. The provisions of Section 5 
were enacted as temporary legislation and set to expire in five years. 
In 1970, however, Congress recognized the need for these special 
provisions to continue in force, and it moved to renew them for an 
additional five years. It was while holding its hearings on reauthoriz-
ing Section 5 that Congress decided to amend the Voting Rights Act 
in other ways as well, and one of these included adding an amend-
ment that targeted durational residency requirements.117 
                                                                                                                  
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except 
as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”). 
 112. Id.; see also Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter 
Qualifications Clause of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159 (2015).  
 113. Voting Rights Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 316 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)).  
 114. See Richard Pildes, What Does the Court’s Decision Mean?, 12 ELECTION L.J. 317, 
317 (2013) (calling the Voting Rights Act a “sacred symbol” of American democracy); see 
also Eugene D. Mazo, The Voting Rights Act at 50 and the Section on Election Law at Birth: 
A Perspective, 14 ELECTION L.J. 282, 283-85, 287-89 (2015) (assessing the history of the 
Voting Rights Act on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary).  
 115. See Mazo, supra note 114, at 288; see also STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, ‘‘THE LAW IS 
GOOD’’: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, REDISTRICTING, AND BLACK REGIME POLITICS, at  
xii (2010).  
 116. Mazo, supra note 114, at 288. 
 117. Voting Rights Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 316 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)); see also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 192-
93 (1971).  
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 Using its constitutional power to alter the rules pertaining to fed-
eral elections, Congress added a new Section 202 to the Voting Rights 
Act in 1970. It was aimed at regulating how the states conducted 
their presidential elections. So that no mistake was made as to the 
intent of Section 202, its very first paragraphs stated the following: 
Section 202(a). The Congress hereby finds that the imposition and 
application of the durational residency requirement as a precondi-
tion to voting for the offices of President and Vice President, and 
the lack of sufficient opportunities for absentee registration and 
absentee balloting in presidential elections—  
(1) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens 
to vote for their President and Vice President; 
(2) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens 
to enjoy their free movement across State lines; 
. . . 
(5) has the effect of denying to citizens the equality of civil rights, 
and due process and equal protection of the laws that are guaran-
teed to them under the fourteenth amendment; and 
(6) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State 
interest in the conduct of presidential elections.118 
To guarantee and protect the right to vote, Congress found that it 
was necessary to abolish the durational residency requirement as a 
precondition to voting for the President and Vice President, as well 
as to establish nationwide standards relative to absentee registration 
and absentee balloting for future presidential elections.119 
 Under Section 202, Congress moved to accomplish these goals in 
several ways. First, it prohibited individual states from imposing a 
durational residency requirement on any U.S. citizen who was oth-
erwise qualified to vote in a presidential election and who wanted to 
register and vote for the President or Vice President of the United 
States.120 Second, it prohibited the states from denying a citizen the 
right to vote in a presidential election if that person was validly reg-
istered to vote but happened not to be physically present in his state 
at the time of the election.121 If the citizen was absent, the state now 
                                                                                                                  
 118. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Title II, § 202 (a)(1)-(6), 84 Stat. 314, 316. 
 119. Id. § 202(b). 
 120. Id. § 202(c) (“No citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in 
any election for President and Vice President shall be denied the right to vote for electors 
for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, in such election be-
cause of the failure of such citizen to comply with any durational residency requirement of 
such State or political subdivision . . .”). 
 121. Id. (“[N]or shall any citizen of the United States be denied the right to vote for 
electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, in such elec-
tions because of the failure of such citizen to be physically present in such State or political 
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had to provide him with the opportunity to cast an absentee ballot to 
vote for the President or Vice President.122 Third, Congress mandated 
that the states had to allow a citizen to vote in a presidential election 
if he was registered to vote thirty days before the election took 
place.123 Finally, if the citizen moved to his new state within thirty 
days of a presidential election, he had to be given the right to vote by 
absentee ballot in his or her former state of residence.124  
 In addition to extending the coverage of Section 5 the Voting 
Rights Act and changing the way that Americans vote for the Presi-
dent and Vice President with the addition of Section 202, the 1970 
Amendments suspended the use of literary tests as a prerequisite to 
voting in all states.125 The 1970 Amendments also mandated that 
states lower their voting age to eighteen for all federal, state, and lo-
cal elections.126 Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts pushed 
for this last provision to be added to the 1970 Amendments, knowing 
that his colleagues in Congress would find it impossible to deny the 
right to vote to young people, many of whom were fighting and dying 
for their country in Vietnam.127 Although durational residency re-
quirements presented too minor of an issue to capture the imagina-
tion of most American citizens, they did receive some attention 
among the constellation of voting rights issues that were on the  
national stage. The fact that they were presented as part of a pack-
                                                                                                                  
subdivision at the time of such election, if such citizen shall have complied with the re-
quirements prescribed by the law of such State or political subdivision providing for the 
casting of absentee ballots in such election.”). 
 122. Id. § 202(d) (“[E]ach State shall provide by law for the casting of absentee ballots 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice Presi-
dent, by all duly qualified residents of such State who may be absent from their election 
district or unit in such State on the day such election is held . . . .”). 
 123. Id. (“[E]ach State shall provide by law for the registration of other means of quali-
fication of all duly qualified residents of such State who apply, not later than thirty days 
immediately prior to any presidential election, for registration or qualification to vote for 
the choice of electors for President and Vice President . . . .”). 
 124. Id. § 202(e).  
 125. The Voting Rights Act’s new section 201 imposed a ban on literacy tests and de-
vices as conditions for voter registration in all jurisdictions until August 6, 1975. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1970). Section 4(a) of the Act, passed in 1965, had already suspended 
literacy tests in “covered jurisdictions” until August 6, 1975. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 437, 438. 
 126. Section 302 granted the right to vote at age eighteen in every primary and general 
election. See GARRINE P. LANEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, 
AS AMENDED: ITS HISTORY AND CURRENT ISSUES 16 (2008), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/109556.pdf. Although the Supreme Court invalidated this provision for state 
and local elections, the 26th Amendment, ratified in 1971, later would guarantee the right 
of eighteen-year-olds to vote in all elections. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
 127. See GARY MAY, BENDING TOWARD JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 206-07 (2013) (noting how Kennedy cam-
paigned to reduce the national voting age and quoting him as saying that “half of the 
deaths in Vietnam are of young Americans under twenty-one”). 
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age, together with the other voting rights reforms included in the 
1970 Amendments, ensured they could pass through Congress. 
 Though voting rights occupied center stage in the American con-
sciousness in the early 1970s, it has not always been evident to 
scholars why the conservative Nixon administration offered the 1970 
Amendments. Professor Keyssar suggests that the new rules consti-
tuted “safe, uncontroversial means of responding to a resurgence of 
public concern about low electoral turnout,” and that they may have 
“buttressed the Republican Party’s presentation of itself as an advo-
cate of universal suffrage.”128 The new changes called for by the 1970 
Amendments also could have been influenced by the shift in thinking 
about the nature of American society, which had become more geo-
graphically mobile after World War II.129 In the nineteenth century, 
when most of the states’ durational residency requirement were en-
acted, most Americans were born, raised, and spent the bulk of their 
lives living in a single community.130 By contrast, the “mobile” part of 
the population was comprised of unskilled workers and migrants.131 
But, as Professor Keyssar points out, this pattern shifted in the 
twentieth century, with the middle and upper classes becoming much 
more mobile and workers becoming much less so.132  
 President Richard Nixon had expressed doubts about the constitu-
tionality of some of the new voting provisions that had been passed 
with the 1970 Amendments, especially the lowering of the voting age 
to eighteen. Vetoing Congress’s bill, however, was not in the cards for 
Nixon. Although doing so would appease the South, the prospect of 
limiting the franchise after a proposal had been made to expand it 
would have put him at odds with public opinion, not to mention many 
members of his own Republican Party who had voted for these 
changes. Thus on June 22, 1970, Nixon quietly signed the 1970 
Amendments into law.133 At the same time, he instructed his Attor-
ney General, John Mitchell, to challenge them in court.134 
 Nixon’s challenge resulted in Oregon v. Mitchell,135 the case in 
which the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Vot-
ing Rights Act Amendments of 1970. The Court examined whether 
Congress could lower the voting age, ban literacy tests, and forbid 
durational residency requirements from disqualifying voters, each as 
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 129. See id.  
 130. See id.  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  
 133. See MAY, supra note 127, at 208. 
 134. Statement on Signing the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 1970 PUB. 
PAPERS 512 (June 22, 1970). 
 135. 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970). 
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separate issues. The Supreme Court held it unconstitutional for Con-
gress to lower the voting age for state elections, while it upheld its 
right to do so in federal elections.136 Justice Hugo Black found that 
the Elections Clause allowed Congress to regulate federal elections,137 
though no such provision in the Constitution also allowed it to regu-
late the election of state officials.138 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 
which lowered the voting age to eighteen years of age throughout the 
country, including in the states, was ratified a year later, in reaction 
to Oregon v. Mitchell.139 In addition to finding that Congress could 
regulate the vote age for federal elections, the case also upheld Con-
gress’s ban on literacy tests under the Fifteenth Amendment.140 
 In finding that Congress had the power to regulate federal though 
not state elections, Oregon v. Mitchell was important for another rea-
son: the case also upheld Congress’s imposition of the “30-day” regis-
tration rule on the states for presidential elections.141 Though there 
were different allegiances of Justices for other parts of the opinion, 
the vote finding that Congress had the power to impose a thirty-day 
registration deadline for federal presidential elections was eight to 
one.142 Justice Black based his reasoning on the power that Congress 
had to regulate federal elections under Article I, Section 4.143 Justice 
Douglas wrote separately to explain that he would uphold the re-
quirement under Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment.144 Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall found yet 
other justifications for upholding this requirement, including the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the guarantee that citizens 
should have the right to travel freely across state lines.145 Only Jus-
tice Harlan dissented, arguing that none of these constitutional pro-
visions should have been availing in this case.146  
 After Oregon v. Mitchell upheld the 1970 Amendments and their 
prohibition on durational residency requirements, the states were 
                                                                                                                  
 136. Id. at 117-18. 
 137. Id. at 119-24 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4). 
 138. See id. at 124-29. 
 139. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (“The right of citizens of the United States, who are 
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of age.”). 
 140. Oregon, 400 U.S. at 132. 
 141. Id. at 134.  
 142. See id. at 213-16 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining that it is “inconceivable” that 
the language of the Constitution can be understood to abolish state durational residency 
requirements). 
 143. Id. at 119-24. 
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 146. Id. at 213-14.  
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essentially forced to make a choice: they could now either shorten 
their durational residency requirements for electing state officials to 
approximately thirty days, or they could waste state resources to 
administer two different durational residency or registration dead-
lines for voting. Many states that would otherwise have preferred  
a period of duration longer than thirty days suddenly found it to  
be more trouble than it was worth to maintain one deadline for regis-
tering their citizens to vote for the U.S. President and another dead-
line to register the same individuals to vote for other state offices.147 
In many states, this brought a swift end to the lengthy durational 
residency requirements that the states had previously imposed.  
B.   The Judicial Challenge 
 Despite the mandate that came from Congress for the states to 
shorten the registration period for presidential elections to thirty 
days, there were places where lengthy durational residency require-
ments for state electoral contests continued to persist. Not all states, 
after all, were interested in applying the 30-day registration period 
required for presidential elections to their state elections. Then, in 
the early 1970s, several cases regarding state durational residency 
requirements began to wind their way to the Supreme Court. These 
cases sought to challenge the durational residency laws of the states 
on constitutional grounds. Eventually, the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in these cases worked in tandem with the 1970 Amendments to cur-
tail the ability and authority of the states to impose long durational 
residency requirements on their new voters.  
 The most important of these cases was Dunn v. Blumstein.148 De-
cided in 1972, this case held that Tennessee’s one-year residency re-
quirement for voting in state elections violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.149 James Blumstein had 
moved to Tennessee on June 12, 1970, to begin employment as an 
assistant professor of law at Vanderbilt University.150 With a view 
toward voting in the upcoming August and November elections, he 
went to register to vote on July 1, 1970.151 The county registrar re-
fused to register him, however, because Tennessee law authorized 
the registration of only those people who were residents of the state 
for a year and residents of their county for three months.152 
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 Blumstein did not challenge Tennessee’s power to restrict the vote 
to bona fide residents of the state.153 Nor did Tennessee dispute that 
Blumstein was a bona fide resident.154 Rather, Tennessee insisted 
that in addition to being a resident, a would-be voter had to satisfy 
its durational residency laws.155 In Dunn, the Supreme Court had to 
determine, for the first time, what level of scrutiny to apply to state 
durational residency requirements. Noting that these laws penalize 
people who travel from one place to another, the Supreme Court ex-
plained how such laws end up dividing a state’s legitimate residents 
into two classes: old residents and new residents.156 Both classes are 
legitimate, from the state’s view, but the state discriminates against 
the latter class of people by denying them the opportunity to vote.157 
Framing the problem in this way, the Court proceeded to analyze 
whether the Constitution allows this kind of discrimination.158  
 Never had durational residency laws been viewed through the 
lens of discrimination. Now the Supreme Court scrutinized the fact 
that these laws prevented some legitimate residents from voting, 
thus depriving a class of citizens of “a fundamental political right, 
[that is] preservative of all rights.”159 Tennessee urged the Supreme 
Court to uphold its one-year durational residency requirement under 
the Court’s own precedents—in 1965, the Court had summarily af-
firmed Drueding v. Devlin,160 upholding a durational residency law in 
Maryland against a constitutional challenge. But in Dunn, the Su-
preme Court distinguished Drueding on the grounds that Drueding 
was a summary affirmance of a district court decision that was de-
cided without the benefit of oral argument.161 Moreover, the sufficien-
cy of Maryland’s durational residency law had been tested in Drued-
ing under the standard that would typically be applied to ordinary 
state regulations, not under the more exacting standard that had 
been developed for voting rights cases in the ensuing years.  
 In several important voting rights cases, the Supreme Court had 
decided that strict scrutiny should be applied to laws that discrimi-
                                                                                                                  
 153. Id. at 334.  
 154. Id.  
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. at 334-35. 
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 158. Id. at 335. 
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nated between different classes of a state’s citizens. In the most im-
portant of these cases, Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,162 
decided in 1969, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to a state 
law that prevented residents from voting in the local school board if 
they did not own property or have children enrolled in the local 
schools. Kramer held that if a state law granted the right to vote to 
some citizens and denied it to others, the courts had to determine 
whether such exclusions were necessary “to promote a compelling 
state interest.”163 In Dunn, the Supreme Court found that Tennes-
see’s residency statutes impinged on a fundamental right—the right 
to vote—and thus should be subject to strict scrutiny.164 In addition, 
the Court found that Tennessee’s residency rules also directly im-
pinged on a second fundamental right, “the right to travel.”165 Having 
determined that strict scrutiny was mandated, the Court went on to 
distinguish durational residency requirements from bona fide resi-
dency requirements that ensure that voters are actually citizens of 
the state and county in which they register, and that “may be neces-
sary to preserve the basic conception of a political community.”166  
 Tennessee had offered two justifications for its residency qualifica-
tions. The first was to “[i]nsure [the] [p]urity of [the] [b]allot [b]ox.”167 
State officials feared that non-residents would cross state lines, false-
ly swear allegiance to Tennessee, and vote by fraud to sway its elec-
tions.168 The Supreme Court dismissed this justification.169 Residence 
in Tennessee was established by taking an oath, and there was no 
evidence that the state took any actions beyond requiring an oath to 
check that a person was a bona fide resident.170 It was not clear to the 
Court how a longer durational residency period would prevent a cor-
rupt non-resident from fraudulently registering and voting.171 In ad-
dition, the Court found it difficult to justify Tennessee having two 
different duration periods.172 If only a three-month period was needed 
to determine a person’s legitimate residency in his county, it was un-
clear why a one-year period was required to legitimate a voter’s resi-
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dency in the state.173 The presence of two different durational re-
quirements was illogical. Moreover, if Congress had already set the 
amount of time that a state had to register a new voter to cast a bal-
lot in a federal presidential election at thirty days, with the 1970 
Amendments, it was not entirely clear why a state needed more time 
than this to register the same person to vote in its state elections. 
 The second justification that Tennessee provided for its durational 
qualifications was to ensure a “knowledgeable voter.”174 Tennessee 
wanted to have voters who had become members of the community, 
were interested in matters of government, and were likely to vote in-
telligently.175 But the Supreme Court dismissed this justification as 
well, for again it allowed the state to discriminate against different 
classes of citizens based on arbitrary criteria.  
 In Kramer, New York had tried to prevent a childless adult from 
voting in a school board election because the state argued that non-
parents were “less informed” about school affairs than parents were. 
New York wanted to limit the franchise only to voters who were “in-
terested” in the outcome of its school board elections.176 The Supreme 
Court applied strict scrutiny and struck down the statute in question, 
finding that New York’s classification, which excluded non-parents 
from voting, prevented some people from voting who were as sub-
stantially interested in what a local school board did as those allowed 
to vote.177 Similarly, in Dunn, the Court struck down Tennessee’s du-
rational residency requirement because Tennessee’s law proved to be 
a crude device for achieving the state’s goal of assuring a knowledge-
able electorate.178 Tennessee allowed all longtime residents to vote 
regardless of their knowledge of the issues. At the same time, it ex-
cluded new residents who sought to educate themselves.179  
 Ultimately, Dunn held that “30 days appears to be an ample peri-
od of time for the State to complete whatever administrative tasks 
are necessary to prevent fraud—and a year, or three months, too 
much.”180 That finding suddenly threatened to place a significant 
burden on states to prove that their lengthy durational residency re-
quirements were necessary and served a compelling state interest.  
 The very next year, however, the Court decided two related cases 
that seemed to extend the state durational residency period beyond 
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what was allowed in Dunn. In Marston v. Lewis,181 decided in 1973, 
the Court upheld a fifty-day durational residency requirement in Ari-
zona. This time the Court relied on the state’s legislative judgment 
that this period was “necessary to achieve the State’s legitimate 
goals.”182 In particular, Arizona had relied on a volunteer deputy reg-
istrar system that was massive in scope and that resulted in a cer-
tain number of mistakes per registered voter, which the state needed 
more time to correct at each precinct.183 Another factor that was 
unique in Arizona was the timing of the state’s primary system. Ari-
zonans held their primaries in the fall, and because of their work in 
the primary, country registrars and their staffs were often delayed in 
processing incoming applications to register Arizona voters for the 
general election.184 As such, the Court accepted Arizona’s judgment 
that a period of fifty days was necessary to promote the state’s im-
portant interest in obtaining accurate voter lists.185 However, Justices 
Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan dissented in Marston.186 They 
thought that a thirty-day durational period should suffice for Arizo-
na, especially since, under the 1970 Amendments, the state already 
had to use it to register those voters who wanted to vote in federal 
presidential—but not state—elections.187 
 On the same day in 1973 that Marston was handed down, the 
Court also decided Burns v. Fortson,188 upholding a Georgia statute 
that required all registrars to close their voter registration books fifty 
days prior to the November general election, except regarding those 
persons who sought to vote for the President of the United States on-
ly. Georgia offered extensive evidence to establish the need for a fifty-
day registration cut-off, given the numerous requirements and vagar-
ies of its election laws. A registration cut-off, technically, is not the 
same thing as a durational residency requirement, and the distinc-
tion is important to explain. A durational residency requirement ap-
plies only to new residents, while a registration cut-off deadline ap-
plies to all state residents who seek to register to vote. However, in 
practice, the two requirements work similarly. Still, if Dunn held 
that the maximum permissible durational residency requirement was 
thirty days, the decisions in Marston and Burns seemed to challenge 
that. Should the limit be set at thirty days? Fifty days? Sixty days? In 
Burns, the Court held that “the 50-day registration period approach-
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es the outer constitutional limits in this area,”189 but it did not state 
exactly what those limits were. Scholars have since suggested that 
the maximum period is likely somewhere between the fifty days  
approved in Burns and the three months struck down in Dunn.190 
C.   The Modern Durational Residency Requirement 
 Ultimately, two factors led to the demise of lengthy durational res-
idency requirements in the states—at least for voters. The first had 
to do with the intervention of the federal government in the form of 
the 1970 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The second 
had to do with the intervention of the Supreme Court. Both happened 
in the 1970s, on the heels of the voting rights struggles of the 1960s.  
 Today, given that the Supreme Court has declared lengthy resi-
dency requirements for voting in state and local elections unconstitu-
tional, most of the states have changed or eliminated their durational 
residency requirements to comply with the Court’s rulings. Instead, 
they have implemented registration cut-off deadlines by which voters 
have to register. In Hawaii, the registration cut-off deadline is thirty 
days.191 In other states, such as Florida and Arizona, the cut-off is 
twenty-nine days.192 In Kentucky, it is twenty-eight days.193 Another 
set of states requires approximately three weeks for new registra-
tions. The time period is twenty-four days in Oklahoma;194 twenty-
two days in Colorado;195 twenty-one days in Maryland, Maine, Ore-
gon, Virginia, and West Virginia;196 and twenty days in Kansas, Mas-
sachusetts, and Minnesota.197 Other jurisdictions close their registra-
tion periods approximately two weeks before an election. In Alabama 
and California the period is fourteen days,198 and in Iowa it is eleven 
days.199 Connecticut requires a new voter to be registered only seven 
                                                                                                                  
 189. Id. at 687. 
 190. See, e.g., LeClerq, supra note 3, at 862 (“The maximum constitutionally permissi-
ble durational residency requirement for voting is . . . apparently somewhere between the 
3-months intrastate requirement disapproved in Dunn and the 50-day requirement ap-
proved in Marston and Burns.”). 
 191. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-24 (West 2015). 
 192. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-101(A)(2) (2015); FLA. STAT. § 97.055(1)(a) (2015).  
 193. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.045(2) (West 2015). 
 194. OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 26, § 4-103 (West 2015).  
 195. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-201(3)(b)(I) (2015). 
 196. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-302 (LexisNexis 2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
21-A, § 121-A (2015); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 247.025 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-
416 (2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-2-6 (LexisNexis 2015). 
 197. KAN. STAT. ANN § 25-2311 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 51, § 26 (2015); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 201.054 (West 2015).  
 198. ALA. CODE § 17-3-50 (2015); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3400 (West 2015).  
 199. IOWA CODE ANN. § 48A.9 (West 2015). 
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days before an election,200 and at least one state—North Dakota—
uses same-day voter registration, so that a new voter could actually 
register to vote and cast his or her ballot on the same day.201 Table 2 
contains a fifty-state survey of durational residency periods and  
registration cut-off periods in the United States as of 2015.202 
 Two points deserve emphasis. First, some states have managed to 
retain registration periods that are longer than thirty days, although 
there are not many of them. Georgia currently requires a voter to 
register by the “fifth Monday . . . prior to the . . . election,” which in 
practice puts the registration deadline out five to six weeks.203 Sec-
ond, it must be emphasized again that modern registration periods 
are not exactly the same as the durational residency qualifications 
that were challenged in Dunn. The justification for asking a citizen to 
register at least thirty days before an election is administrative effi-
ciency.204 States do not set up these registration deadlines to restrict 
the franchise, to control their community of voters, or to create more 
knowledgeable voters. Today, that would be unconstitutional. Rather, 
they do it because that is how long it takes them to process a voter’s 
paperwork, verify his address, and communicate his eligibility to the 
municipality where the election will be held.205  
 Finally, though state durational qualifications for voting have 
withered, there is another sense in which state durational residency 
requirements have not disappeared. Even after it became illegal for 
the states to apply durational residency requirements to the right to 
exercise one’s vote, the states continued to apply them to other areas 
of everyday life as a way of protecting their resources from newcom-
ers and outsiders. Over the years, durational residency requirements 
have been applied to prevent newly-resident students from seeking 
in-state tuition,206 to keep new residents from using a state’s laws to 
file for divorce,207 to restrict new residents from receiving a state’s 
                                                                                                                  
 200. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-23g (West 2015). 
 201. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-05.1 (2015).  
 202. Calculations made by author based on a 50-state survey of state statutes. Com-
plete dataset of these statutes is on file with the author and available upon request. 
 203. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-224 (2015). 
 204. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348 (1972) (noting “that 30 days ap-
pears to be an ample period of time for the State to complete whatever administrative 
tasks are necessary to prevent fraud—and a year, or three months, too much”). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See Lawrence J. Conlan, Durational Residency Requirements for In-State Tuition: 
Searching for Access to Affordable Higher Learning, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1389 (2002); William 
S. Eubanks II, North Carolina’s Durational Residency Requirement for In-State Tuition: 
Violating the Constitution’s Inherent Right to Travel, 1 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 199 (2009); 
Susan L. Kanclier, Stateless Students: Oregon’s Durational Residency Requirement for 
Purposes of Tuition, 74 OR. L. REV. 1319 (1995).  
 207. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (upholding a one-year durational residency 
period in the state of Iowa for new residents to be able to file a petition for divorce); see also 
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welfare benefits,208 to keep a new resident from becoming a municipal 
employee, and to make it harder to gain admission to the bar.209 
Where courts have determined that durational residency require-
ments impinge on a fundamental right, these requirements have 
been invalidated. For example, this has generally been the case when 
states have tried to link state benefits to a resident’s length of resi-
dency in that state.210 Some of the jurisprudence concerning these 
durational residency qualifications has been controversial. Yet there 
is one group of individuals to whom durational residency qualifica-
tions have been consistently applied less controversially: newly-
resident political candidates seeking to get elected to a state office. At 
least at the state level, politicians generally continue to be barred by 
durational residency requirements, as we are about to see. 
IV.   THE STABILITY OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY  
REQUIREMENTS FOR CANDIDATES 
 A different story emerges with respect to durational residency re-
quirements for candidates. Durational residency qualifications con-
tinue to be imposed on many political office-seekers by state law and 
by state constitutional provisions. These requirements have been jus-
tified by the states as ensuring more informed and knowledgeable 
political candidates, guaranteeing the exposure of prospective candi-
dates to voters, and assuring that a candidate running for office is a 
member of the political community he hopes to represent.  
 There have been many cases in the courts challenging durational 
residency requirements as they apply to candidates for office.211 But 
whereas durational residency requirements for voters were struck 
down under such challenges, courts have largely upheld the dura-
tional residency requirements for candidates. In so doing, they have 
drawn a sharp distinction between the right to vote and the right to 
                                                                                                                  
Doris Jonas Freed & Henry H. Foster, Jr., Durational Residency Requirements as Prerequi-
sites for Divorce Jurisdiction, 9 FAM. L.Q. 555 (1975); William H. Luker, Durational Resi-
dency Requirements for Divorce, 29 ARK. L. REV. 415 (1975); David E. Pierce, Durational 
Residency Requirements for Divorce, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1976); Note, Durational Resi-
dency Requirements for Divorce, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 187 (1974).  
 208. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (invalidating a California welfare statute 
that imposed a one-year waiting period on new state residents); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down a one-year residency period imposed by a state as a prereq-
uisite to receiving welfare payments on the basis that this would allow a state to discrimi-
nate between different classes of state residents); see also David A. Donahue, Durational 
Residency Requirements for Welfare Benefits, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 451 (1998).  
 209. Paul G. Gill, Invalidation of Residency Requirements for Admission to the Bar: 
Opportunities for General Reform, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 231 (1989).  
 210. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (invalidating an Alaska statute that 
distributed the state’s income from oil revenues among state residents based on each citi-
zen’s length of residence within the state). 
 211. See Pitts, supra note 3, at 347 n.22 (listing several such cases). 
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be a candidate for office. In part, the durational residency require-
ments for candidates have been more difficult to challenge because 
they have long been enshrined in state constitutions. At the same 
time, it is worth noting that the situation facing candidates for feder-
al office differs from that facing candidates for state office. At the 
federal level, there are no durational residency requirements for can-
didates to satisfy, apart from those for the President and Vice Presi-
dent. However, at the state level, these requirements abound. Thus, 
durational residency requirements for candidates differ by office. 
A.   At the State Level 
 Durational residency requirements are common for state offices, 
such as the office of the governor or a member of the state legislature. 
Candidates for governor can expect to face some of the most stringent 
durational residency requirements in the nation. As Table 3 indi-
cates, Missouri and Oklahoma impose a ten-year durational residen-
cy requirement on gubernatorial candidates.212 A durational residen-
cy period of seven years is also not unheard of. Alabama, Alaska, Ar-
kansas, Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
Tennessee all require their candidates for governor to be a state resi-
dent for seven years before they can be elected to office.213 Another 
seventeen states set the durational residency period for governor at 
five years.214 In only a handful of states are these durational residen-
cy requirements almost entirely absent. Even in these states, a gu-
bernatorial candidate must usually satisfy the same durational resi-
dency period as is required of a state elector or voter. Table 3, below, 
lists the length of the durational residency requirement for the office 
of the governor for every state as of 2015. In most states, these re-
quirements are constitutionally mandated. By contrast, residency 
requirements for local office, such as mayor or city councilman, are 
often set by statutes or municipal codes. They also tend to have much 
shorter durational residency periods. 
                                                                                                                  
 212. See MO. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (Missouri); OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (Oklahoma). 
 213. See ALA. CONST. art. V, § 117 (Alabama); ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 2 (Alaska); 
ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (Arkansas); FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (Florida); MASS. CONST. pt. II, 
ch. 2, § 1, art. II (Massachusetts); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. XLII (New Hampshire); N.J. 
CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 2 (New Jersey); PA. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (Pennsylvania); TENN. 
CONST. art. III, § 3 (Tennessee). 
 214. A five-year period seems to exist in the largest plurality of the states. See, e.g., 
CAL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (California); HAW. CONST. art. V, § 1 (Hawaii); IND. CONST. art. V, § 
7 (Indiana); LA. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (Louisiana); ME. CONST. art. V, pt. I, § 4 (Maine); MISS. 
CONST. art. V, § 117 (Mississippi); NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (Nebraska); N.M. CONST. art.  
V, § 3 (New Mexico); N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (New York); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 4 (North 
Dakota); S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (South Carolina); TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (Texas); UTAH 
CONST. art. VII, § 3 (Utah); VA. CONST. art. V, § 3 (Virginia); WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (Wy-
oming). 
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 As mentioned, in some of the states—including Connecticut, Ohio, 
Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin—the length of time that a 
candidate for governor has to reside in the state will be equivalent to 
the durational residency requirement for a voter in that state. This 
period will usually be around thirty days. But these exceptions are 
rare, and in most cases the durational residency requirement for a 
gubernatorial candidate is many years. Often, the long durational 
residency periods have been used to disqualify new challengers, espe-
cially those who have not recently lived in the state. To understand 
how candidate residency qualifications work, and how they have 
sometimes been used by politicians against their political opponents, 
we might examine some recent durational residency battles that 
have wound up in the courts. Not all state durational residency chal-
lenges concern gubernatorial candidates or candidates seeking state-
wide office. Many of these challenges are local in nature and arise 
during races to fill mayoral offices and city council seats as well.  
 We can compare the legal challenges brought against the candida-
cies of Rahm Emanuel and Zephyr Teachout on durational residency 
grounds. Both of these durational residency challenges attracted sig-
nificant media attention when they occurred, even though the races 
were very different: Rahm Emanuel was running in a mayoral race to 
lead city hall in Chicago while Zephyr Teachout was running for the 
Democratic nomination to become governor of New York. We can also 
contrast the hurdles that Emanuel and Teachout faced in their races 
with those faced by Hillary Clinton in her race to become the U.S. 
Senator from New York in 2000. Hillary Clinton was not a New 
Yorker and had never lived in that state. However, unlike the state 
races, her qualifications could not be challenged on durational resi-
dency grounds because Clinton was running for a federal office.  
 1.   Rahm Emanuel 
 Rahm Emanuel is a Democratic politician who was born and 
raised in Chicago.215 He worked in the Clinton Administration 
through much of the 1990s, including as Assistant to the President 
for Political Affairs and as a Senior Advisor to the President for Poli-
cy and Strategy.216 In 1998, Emanuel resigned from the Clinton 
                                                                                                                  
 215. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (Ill. 2011) (“The can-
didate [Emanuel] was born in Chicago . . . .”). See generally EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, 
BROTHERS EMANUEL: A MEMOIR OF AN AMERICAN FAMILY (2013) (chronicling Rahm Eman-
uel’s Chicago birth and upbringing).  
 216. See Clinton White House Appointments, BALTIMORE SUN (Jan. 15, 1993), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1993-01-15/news/1993015187_1_special-assistant-
domestic-policy-president-and-deputy; Storer H. Rowley, Mayor Rahm Emanuel to Speak 
on Campus, NW. U. (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2012/ 
11/mayor-rahm-emanuel-to-speak-on-campus.html. 
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White House, returned to Chicago, and pursued a career in finance. 
In 2002, he ran for the U.S. House of Representatives from Chicago, 
after Rod Blagojevich, who represented Illinois’s 5th Congressional 
District, announced that he was vacating his seat to run for gover-
nor.217 Blagojevich was elected governor, and Emanuel was elected to 
Blagojevich’s old seat in the 5th Congressional District. Emanuel 
went on to represent that district in Congress from 2003 to 2009. 
When Barack Obama became President, Emanuel became his Chief 
of Staff.218 On January 2, 2009, he resigned from Congress and re-
turned to the White House, this time to work for President Obama.219  
 Emanuel went to great pains to maintain his Chicago residency 
during his time in the White House. From the time his house was 
first purchased in 1998 until he became White House Chief of Staff in 
2009, his family continually resided in their Chicago home,220 while 
Emanuel shuttled back and forth to Washington. During his first six 
months of work in the Obama Administration, Emanuel’s family con-
tinued to remain in their Chicago home while Emanuel rented an “in-
law apartment” in the nation’s capital.221 On June 1, 2009, however, 
Emanuel’s family relocated to Washington. They began to receive 
their mail at the new house they rented in the District of Colum-
bia.222 In the meantime, they rented out their Chicago home to anoth-
er family. Emanuel’s family did leave several large household items 
at their Chicago home, including televisions, a piano, and a bed, in 
addition to books and various family heirlooms. Emanuel also con-
tinued to pay property taxes on his Chicago house, listed his Chicago 
address on his personal checks, and continued to list the address of 
his Chicago house as his official registered voting address.223 He also 
always maintained a valid Illinois driver’s license. 
 Richard M. Daley had been elected the mayor of Chicago in 1989 
and re-elected on five separate occasions since. In 2010, Daley an-
nounced his plans to retire.224 Daley had been leading America’s 
third-largest city for twenty-one years.225 Upon learning this news, 
                                                                                                                  
 217. See Jodi Wilgoren, Ethnic Comments Rattle Race for Congress, N.Y. TIMES  
(Mar. 6, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/06/us/ethnic-comments-rattle-race-for-
congress.html. 
 218. Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1053. 
 219. See id.  
 220. Id. 
 221. Id.  
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 1054. 
 224. See Bob Secter, Daley Won’t Run for Record Seventh Election to Be Mayor, CHI. TRIB. 
(Sept. 8, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-09-08/news/ct-met-daley-legacy-0908-
20100907_1_parking-meter-deal-richard-j-daley-seventh-term. 
 225. Id.  
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Emanuel resigned his position at the White House and announced 
that he would run to become the next mayor of Chicago.226 While 
Emanuel’s family had remained in Chicago when Emanuel served in 
Congress, residing in the house that Emanuel owned, Emanuel’s 
spouse and children had been living in Washington, D.C. for several 
months by the time he announced his mayoral bid, and their Chicago 
home was being occupied by another family.227 When Emanuel decid-
ed to run for mayor, the rental of his Chicago home became a major 
issue in the legal challenge that was brought to Emanuel’s mayoral 
candidacy under Illinois’ durational residency qualifications.228  
 Illinois maintains a durational residency requirement for mayoral 
elections. The Illinois Municipal Code states that a candidate for 
mayor has to reside in the city for at least one year preceding a 
mayoral contest.229 In addition, the candidate himself has to be a 
“qualified elector” in Illinois.230 This means that a mayoral candidate 
has to have been a resident of his voting district during the thirty 
days prior to the election.231 After Emanuel resigned his position at 
the White House, he immediately made plans to return to Illinois. 
But as his Chicago home was now occupied by tenants, who were un-
der contract there until June 30, 2011, Emanuel decided to lease an 
apartment on Milwaukee Avenue, starting on October 1, 2010.232  
 In November 2010, lawyer Burt Odelson filed a legal challenge to 
Emanuel’s mayoral candidacy on behalf of Thomas L. McMahon, a 
retired Chicago police officer, and Walter P. Maksym Jr., a Chicago 
lawyer.233 The challenge asserted that Emanuel did not meet the 
state’s one-year municipal durational residency requirement and that 
his name could not be placed on the ballot for the mayoral election to 
take place on February 22, 2011. McMahon and Maksym took issue 
with Emanuel renting out his Chicago property while he lived in 
Washington, claiming that Illinois law required the mayoral candi-
                                                                                                                  
 226. See Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1053. 
 227. Id. at 1054; Gavin J. Dow, Note, Mr. Emanuel Returns from Washington: Dura-
tional Residence Requirements and Election Litigation, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1515, 1526 
(2013). 
 228. Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1066.  
 229. The relevant provision is Illinois Municipal Code § 3.1-10-5(a), which states: “A 
person is not eligible for an elective municipal office unless that person is a qualified elec-
tor of the municipality and has resided in the municipality at least one year next preceding 
the election or appointment . . . .” 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3.1-10-5(a) (West 2016). 
 230. Id.; see also Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1056-57. 
 231. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3.1-10-5(a) (West 2016). 
 232. Maksym, 950 N.E.2d at 1054. 
 233. See Kristen Mack, Rahm Emanuel’s Residency Challenged in Race for Mayor, CHI. 
TRIB. (Nov. 26, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-11-26/news/ct-met-rahm-
residency-challenge-20101126_1_residency-rules-ballot-challenge-lawyer-burt-odelson.  
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date to be physically present in Chicago for one year.234 Emanuel con-
tended that he met the requirement because he owned a home in 
Chicago, voted there, and always intended to return.235 He also point-
ed to an exception in the state’s election code that protected the resi-
dency status of persons who temporarily left “on business of the 
United States.”236 Emanuel argued that his years in the White House 
fell into this category. The challengers claimed that this exception 
applied only to those who left the state to serve in the military.237  
 McMahon and Maksym’s complaint came before the Board of Elec-
tion Commissioners of the City of Chicago, which, after holding an 
evidentiary hearing, dismissed it and ruled that Emanuel’s name 
should be included on the ballot as a mayoral candidate.238 The Board 
determined that Emanuel had met the qualifications of the Illinois 
Municipal Code.239 The Board noted, and both sides agreed, that “res-
idence” in the Municipal Code referred to “permanent abode,” and 
that two elements were required to prove it: physical presence and 
the intent to remain permanently.240 In the Board’s view, once per-
manent abode was established, residence continued until it was 
“abandoned.”241 Emanuel’s challengers failed to establish that he had 
abandoned his permanent residency in the City of Chicago.242 
 Emanuel’s challengers sought judicial review of the Board’s deci-
sion in the circuit court of Cook County, which affirmed the Board of 
Election Commissioners.243 The circuit court agreed with the Board 
that the relevant question in the case was whether Emanuel had 
abandoned his Chicago residence when he became Chief of Staff to 
the President of the United States.244 Finding that he had not aban-
doned it, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision.245 Emanuel’s 
challengers did not give up, however. They appealed the circuit 
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 236. See id.  
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 238. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (Ill. 2011).  
 239. Id. at 1054. 
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court’s decision to the Illinois Appellate Court.246 There they received 
a more favorable ruling. By a two-to-one vote, the appellate court re-
versed the circuit court and set aside the decision of the Board.247  
 The Illinois Appellate Court focused on the meaning of the words 
“resided in” in the Illinois Municipal Code and specifically the re-
quirement that a candidate must have “resided in the municipality at 
least one year next preceding the election.”248 It noted that the Board 
had used the definition of residence that was appropriate in voter 
qualification cases, but Emanuel’s case was a candidate qualification 
case. The Illinois Appellate Court was not convinced that using the 
same definition of residence for voter qualification contests and can-
didate qualification contests was appropriate. The Illinois Supreme 
Court had never ruled on the matter.249 Thus the Illinois Appellate 
Court determined that the phrase “resided in” in the Municipal Code 
did not refer to a permanent abode, but only to the place where the 
candidate “actually live[s]” or “actually reside[s].”250 
 The Illinois Appellate Court’s decision of January 24, 2011 was 
quickly appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, given that Chicago’s 
mayoral election was less than a month away. Until the appellate rul-
ing, Emanuel had been steamrolling his challengers in the polls. Then, 
within days of ballots being printed and early voting starting in Chicago, 
it seemed as if Emanuel’s name was not going to appear on the ballot.251 
On January 27, 2011, however, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the 
Illinois Appellate Court and held that Emanuel’s name should appear 
after all.252 To reach its decision, it relied on the 140-year-old case of 
Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie.253 When Smith, a longtime resident of 
Illinois, was appointed a circuit judge by the Illinois governor, an action 
was brought to remove him from that office on the grounds that he  
had not been a resident “for at least five years next preceding . . . his 
                                                                                                                  
 246. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 942 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
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appointment,” as the Illinois Constitution then required.254 His chal-
lengers asserted that Smith had moved with his family to Tennessee for 
eight months during the five-year durational period. 
 In 1847, the Illinois Supreme Court found that Smith’s time in 
Tennessee did not result in the abandonment of his Illinois residency. 
Once established, it found that “residence is lost . . . by a union of  
intention and acts,” which are to “be inferred from the surrounding 
circumstances.”255 Smith had frequently declared that his move to 
Tennessee was an experiment, expressed a desire to return home to 
Illinois upon arriving in Tennessee, declined to vote in Tennessee out 
of fear of losing his Illinois citizenship, refused to sell his Illinois law 
books because he thought he would need them when he returned to 
his Illinois practice, and rented out his Illinois residence instead of 
selling it when he left.256 Since Smith was decided, the Illinois courts 
had held that the question of whether a candidate abandoned his 
state residency was a question of intent.257 A residency was estab-
lished with physical presence and intent to remain indefinitely. Once 
established, the test of whether it was kept became abandonment.258 
Thus a person could be physically absent from his residence  
“for months or even years” without abandoning it.259 And whether  
one abandoned his residency turned on what his intent was. Since 
Emanuel owned a house in Illinois while living in Washington, and 
had always said he intended to return to Chicago, the Illinois  
Supreme Court found he never abandoned his residency.  
 After the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision, Emanuel’s name was 
placed on the ballot for mayor of Chicago. On February 22, 2011, he 
won fifty-five percent of the vote and was elected mayor. He was 
reelected in 2015. Emanuel’s durational residency battle attracted 
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rensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, 195 (1888))). 
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widespread media coverage.260 This coverage launched a debate about 
the wisdom of durational residency requirements generally.261 The 
case generated commentary by non-lawyers and had an effect, ac-
cording to Gavin Dow, a little like that which was felt in the after-
math of Bush v. Gore.262 Dow argues that Emanuel’s legal battle 
brought into sharp contrast “the inherent tension between protecting 
voter choice and promoting the rule of law when interpreting and en-
forcing a candidate qualification rule.”263 It also showcased some of 
the complexity that candidate qualification cases involve and some of 
the strain that they put on courts when they are required to make 
quick decisions in a complicated yet important area of the law on the 
eve of an election.264 As Dow rightly explains, this can throw the im-
partiality of the courts into question.265 
 2.   Zephyr Teachout 
 Like Emanuel’s race to become mayor of Chicago, Zephyr 
Teachout’s attempt to challenge Andrew Cuomo, a sitting governor, 
in New York’s Democratic primary demonstrates how durational res-
idency requirements can be used to attack a challenger at the state 
level. Teachout is a law professor and a scholar of election law. Born 
and raised in Vermont, she went to law school at Duke University 
and later was admitted to the North Carolina bar.266 In 2004, she 
worked as Director for Internet Organizing for the presidential cam-
paign of former Vermont governor Howard Dean.267  
 In 2009, Teachout moved to New York to take a position as an as-
sistant professor of law at Fordham University.268 In 2014, when the 
labor-backed Working Families Party of New York considered snub-
bing Andrew Cuomo and giving its ballot line to Teachout, the media 
began to focus on the previously unknown candidate.269 The Working 
Families Party ultimately chose to stick with Cuomo as its candidate, 
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but at that point, Teachout decided that she would run for governor 
of New York on her own. She managed to gather more than 45,000 
signatures and filed paperwork to challenge Cuomo in the Democrat-
ic primary.270 In response, Cuomo immediately challenged her candi-
dacy, asserting that Teachout failed to meet the durational residency 
requirement of the state she wished to govern.  
 Like Illinois, New York maintains a durational residency re-
quirement that candidates for the office of governor must meet. New 
York’s constitution requires a candidate for the office of governor to 
have resided within the state for a five-year period immediately pre-
ceding the election.271 Teachout, who moved to New York in June 
2009 and announced plans to run for governor in July 2014, barely 
met the requirement.272  
 Teachout’s situation differed from Rahm Emanuel’s in several im-
portant respects. Unlike Emanuel, Teachout did not own her own 
home. Emanuel also had a career in Illinois and an established track 
record there prior to serving in the Obama Administration, whereas 
Teachout had never lived in New York before taking up her position 
at Fordham Law School.273 To make matters more complicated, 
Teachout did not consistently remain in New York during the five 
qualifying years needed to satisfy her durational residency require-
ment.274 As an academic, she held various visiting fellowships that 
took her for months at a time outside of the state.275 Nor did Teachout 
always rent an apartment in New York, much less the same apart-
ment.276 She changed homes often. She also stayed with friends in 
New York for long stretches of time without paying any rent.  
 In most legal disputes over a person’s residence, a distinction is 
made between the terms “residence” and “domicile.” Domicile refers 
to the place where an individual has established a permanent home, 
one that he or she intends to return to even if the person may be 
temporarily located elsewhere. Residence, on the other hand, refers 
to a person’s temporary, physical place of abode. However, under 
New York Election Law, the two terms both refer to the candidate’s 
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permanent home.277 New York’s election law defines the term “resi-
dence” as “that place where a person maintains a fixed, permanent 
and principal home and to which he, wherever temporarily located, 
always intends to return.”278 
 Two of Cuomo’s supporters, Harris Weiss and Andrew Sternlicht, 
filed a court petition to challenge Teachout’s candidacy for governor, 
arguing that Teachout did not meet the durational residency re-
quirements set out in New York’s constitution.279 In New York, dis-
putes over a candidate’s residency are generally handled by the  
supreme court in one of New York’s counties. As Teachout resided in 
Brooklyn at the time of this challenge, the supreme court—or trial 
court—in Brooklyn heard her case.280 The court noted Teachout’s per-
ipatetic background. Though she was raised in Vermont, the court 
explained how Teachout had attended college in Connecticut and law 
school in North Carolina.281 She clerked for a judge on the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania, and then returned 
to North Carolina to work as a death penalty lawyer, all while claim-
ing Vermont as her official state of residence.282  
 Once Teachout moved to New York, she resided in at least six dif-
ferent locations within New York City. From August to September 
2009, Teachout sublet an apartment at 22 Irving Place in Manhat-
tan. From September to November 2009, she rented an apartment at 
228 West 25th Street in Manhattan. From December 2009 to March 
2011, she resided with a friend at 241 East 7th Street in Manhattan. 
From April to October 2011, she lived in an apartment at 153 
Roebling Street in Brooklyn. From November 2011 to November 
2012, she resided in an apartment at 72 West 82nd Street in Man-
hattan.283 In November 2012, Teachout began to reside at 171 Wash-
ington Park in Brooklyn, and she was living there at the time of her 
durational residency trial, which took place on August 7-8, 2014.284  
 Unlike Emanuel, who had always been registered to vote in Chi-
cago, even when he lived in the District of Columbia,285 Teachout reg-
istered to vote in New York only about eleven months after she 
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moved there for the first time.286 And while Teachout did file tax re-
turns in New York for the years 2009 through 2013,287 the challeng-
ers to her gubernatorial candidacy made an issue of how often she 
was absent from the state during her years as a resident. Teachout 
spent several summers in Vermont, one summer at the Library of 
Congress in Washington, D.C. working on a book, and time in Arizo-
na working with community organizers.288 In 2010, she spent seven 
weeks in Massachusetts while she taught at Harvard, though she did 
not give up her New York apartment during this time and returned 
to it on weekends. In spring 2014, right before she decided to run for 
governor, Teachout spent another four months living in Washington, 
D.C. as a fellow of the New America Foundation.289 During this time, 
she sublet her Brooklyn apartment to someone else.290 
 Teachout’s challengers claimed that her many absences from the 
state meant she did not manifest the necessary intent to make New 
York her domicile for purposes of satisfying New York’s Election 
Law,291 which required physical presence and intent to remain indef-
initely. They also pointed out how, despite living in New York since 
2009, Teachout continued to use her parent’s Vermont address on  
her driver’s license and car registration. She also used the Vermont 
address as her address on file with the North Carolina bar, and  
for documents she had filed with the government, such as her W-4, 
employee wage withholding forms, and for a form she filed with the 
Federal Election Commission after contributing to President 
Obama’s reelection campaign.292 The challengers also showed that 
Teachout had registered to vote in New York only in May 2010,  
almost eleven months after she arrived, though she did not vote  
anywhere else since.293  
 At her trial on August 7–8, 2014, the supreme court of King’s 
County, in Brooklyn, ultimately ruled in Teachout’s favor.294 The 
court explained that the challengers had the burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that Teachout had not been a resident 
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of New York for five years prior to the election. They failed to meet 
that burden.295 The court found that Teachout’s multiple apartments 
in New York City were “all places where she lived, ate her meals, 
slept, kept her personal items/clothing, furnished and/or decorated, 
and where she occasionally entertained.”296 Regarding the Vermont 
address and not applying for a New York driver’s license until May 5, 
2014, the court accepted Teachout’s explanation that she maintained 
the Vermont address as a mail drop because it was more reliable 
than her apartment address, and that she, like many New Yorkers, 
did not drive a car while in the city.297 The court found that she con-
tinuously maintained a domicile and residence in New York. She was 
physically present there, and intended to remain indefinitely. 
 Cuomo’s campaign continued its efforts to disqualify Teachout by 
appealing the ruling. But an appellate court affirmed the decision of 
the trial court, allowing Teachout’s name to remain on the guberna-
torial ballot.298 As the appeals court explained: “Although Zephyr R. 
Teachout has resided in several different residences within the City 
of New York since 2009, while maintaining close connections to her 
childhood domicile of Vermont, that is nothing more than an ambigu-
ity in the residency calculus.”299  
 New York’s durational residency requirement was used by Cuo-
mo’s campaign as a political tool to undermine his opponent, and it 
allowed Cuomo to avoid debating Teachout on the issues. Teachout 
told newspapers that the residency challenge was a blatant attempt 
to intimidate her and sap her campaign of time and resources.300 
When asked about Cuomo’s decision to appeal, Teachout pointed out 
how Cuomo had refused to debate her. Teachout and Tim Wu, a pro-
fessor at Columbia Law School who was running for lieutenant gov-
ernor, had asked Cuomo to debate them. “It’s time to take it out of 
the courtroom and into a debate,” Teachout told the media.301 But 
Cuomo, less than three weeks before the election, refused. Instead, 
he used the durational residency requirement to challenge Teachout’s 
ability to run for governor in the first place. Though Teachout’s name 
remained on the ballot in New York’s Democratic primary for gover-
nor, she ultimately lost that primary to Cuomo on September 9, 2014. 
Still, Teachout received thirty-four percent of the vote. Given her lack 
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of name recognition and lack of experience in elected politics, this 
result clearly demonstrated the displeasure that many Democratic 
primary voters had with New York’s sitting governor. 
B.   At the Federal Level 
 We have seen how durational residency requirements exist in al-
most all of the states. At the federal level, however, due to the unique 
compromise that the framers reached in 1787, the situation that po-
litical candidates face is quite different. According to the Constitu-
tion, a member of the House only has to be an “inhabitant” of the 
state from which he is chosen to serve “when elected.”302 There is no 
durational residency qualification to meet, and the term “inhabitant,” 
which is looser than “resident,” implies that the candidate only has to 
reside in the state on the day of his election. Similarly, a U.S. Senate 
candidate only has to be an “inhabitant” of the state from which he is 
chosen “when elected.”303 Whenever states have tried to add require-
ments, the Supreme Court has disallowed this.304 Although we would 
not normally expect a candidate to run for a federal office in one state 
when the candidate happens to reside in another, this has actually 
happened several times in American history. Such situations put into 
stark contrast the mismatch between how the durational residency 
regimes function at the state and federal levels.  
 Hillary Rodham Clinton’s race for the United States Senate in 
New York provides an example of what candidates for federal office 
can do in the absence durational residency requirements. In 1999, 
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan decided not to seek re-election 
from New York, announcing his decision to vacate the U.S. Senate 
seat that he had held since 1977. Almost immediately, longtime vet-
erans of New York’s politics began trying to convince Hillary Clinton, 
who was then the wife of the sitting U.S. President, to run for 
Moynihan’s seat.305 Representative Charles Rangel, who had long 
represented Harlem in Congress, first suggested the idea at a speech 
he gave in Chicago. Harold Ickes, a political advisor to the Clintons, 
later tried to convince Hillary Clinton in person to run for Moyni-
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han’s seat.306 One problem, however, was that Hillary Clinton was 
not from New York—in fact, she had never lived in the state.307  
 Born in 1947 in Park Ridge, Illinois, Clinton spent the first eight-
een years of her life in the suburbs of Chicago, before leaving in 1965 
for college in Massachusetts, in 1969 for law school in Connecticut, 
and in 1974 to begin her career in Arkansas.308 For the next eighteen 
years, from 1974 until 1992, the Clintons lived in Arkansas, where 
they dominated the state’s political scene, as Bill Clinton first served 
one term as Arkansas’s attorney general and then five terms as the 
state’s governor.309 During this time, Hillary became a partner at a 
prominent Little Rock law firm and a high profile lawyer in the 
state.310 When Bill Clinton was elected president in 1992, the Clin-
tons moved to Washington, D.C. They resided in the White House 
from 1993 to 2000. 
 While Hillary Clinton could legitimately claim to be the daughter 
of Illinois or Arkansas, her claim to New York was more tenuous—or 
rather, it was non-existent. Yet Clinton, both as the wife of the Presi-
dent and in her own right, had widespread name recognition, and she 
worked hard to change her image and brand herself as a New Yorker 
even if she had, in fact, never been one. On November 1, 1999, she 
and her husband bought a $1.7 million, five-bedroom, Dutch Colonial 
house in Chappaqua, New York, a suburb located in Westchester 
County. She then announced that the family would move there after 
Bill Clinton’s presidency ended. Hillary Clinton did not reside in this 
house immediately, as her official home remained in the White 
House. But the purchase of the Chappaqua home generated a great 
deal of media attention, and it allowed Hillary Clinton to begin plant-
ing New York roots, even when she was still registered to vote in Ar-
kansas.311 This was the first time the Clintons had owned a house in 
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seventeen years.312 Having a home in New York gave Hillary an aura 
of legitimacy and allowed her to present the appearance that she was 
campaigning from a base in New York State.  
 There were three reasons why Hillary’s candidacy was ultimately 
successful and why she was not challenged as a carpetbagger. The 
first is that New Yorkers, unlike residents of other states, are espe-
cially forgiving of outsiders. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. had already been 
elected to the U.S. Senate from New York as an out-of-state candi-
date in 1964.313 That New Yorkers were not bothered by Clinton’s 
out-of-state roots was shown in the polls.314 As First Lady, Clinton 
was considered a national figure, and being from Illinois, or Arkan-
sas, or Washington, D.C. seemed not to make much difference to the 
New Yorkers who elected her to the U.S. Senate in 2000.315 
 A second and more important reason for Hillary’s success was that 
she faced very little opposition. After not having any serious Demo-
cratic challengers in the primary, Clinton expected to face New York 
City’s popular mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, in the general election. Giu-
liani consistently attacked Clinton as a carpetbagger in the media.316 
Ultimately, however, he dropped out of the race.317 His replacement, 
Rick Lazio, a Republican who represented New York’s 2nd Congres-
sional District in the U.S. House, hardly had Hillary Clinton’s name 
recognition. Lazio proved to be a lackluster candidate.  
 The final reason that Hillary Clinton was successful was that she 
ran for a federal office. As we saw, the Constitution does not main-
tain a durational residency qualification for federal congressional  
office-seekers. The only requirement is that a Senate candidate must 
be an inhabitant of the state from which he is chosen “when elect-
ed.”318 Hence, while the residency issue in Hillary Clinton’s race for 
the Senate may have been a political issue, it could not be turned into 
a legal issue by her opponents. A legal challenge based on the dura-
tion of Hillary Clinton’s residency would have been frivolous. Clinton 
owned a house in New York on the day of the election, and on  
November 7, 2000, she beat Lazio with fifty-five percent of the vote.  
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C.   Comparing Candidate Residencies 
 The above case studies show how candidate residency require-
ments vary by state and by office. Residency requirements for federal 
legislative office do not exist. Within the states, durational residency 
requirements very much do exist. They differ greatly, however, de-
pending on whether they affect statewide or municipal candidates. 
Within each state, municipalities will often have their own, unique 
durational requirements. Some of these durational residency re-
quirements for state offices can be fairly long. In New Hampshire, for 
instance, a candidate has to be a resident of the state for seven years 
before he is eligible to run for a seat in the state senate, though only 
for two years if he wishes to serve in the state house.319 In both cases, 
the candidate must also reside in the district from which he is elect-
ed.320 Table 4 lists the durational residency requirements for each 
house of the state senate in all fifty states as of 2015. Table 5, which 
follows it, lists the durational residency requirements for the lower 
house of each state legislature in all fifty states.  
New Hampshire’s seven-year durational residency requirement to 
serve in that state’s senate is the longest in the country.321 However, 
there are other states that also possess relatively long requirements. 
In Massachusetts and New York, the durational residency require-
ment for the state senate is five years.322 In Mississippi, New Jersey, 
and Pennsylvania, it is four years.323 In many other states, a dura-
tional residency of two or three years is common.324 For the lower 
house of the state legislature, the durational residency requirement 
is typically much shorter, but not universally so. In New York, it re-
mains five years,325 while in Mississippi and Pennsylvania it is four 
years,326 and in a number of other states the durational requirement  
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is three years.327 (Note that Nebraska is listed in each table, even 
though that state has a unicameral legislature.) Given the high rates 
of relocation that exist among Americans, these requirements pre-
sent significant impediments to running for office in many states. 
V.   THE WISDOM OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS 
A.   Judicial Justifications 
 Why do states continue to have durational residency require-
ments? One scholar who has recently examined this issue, Professor 
Michael Pitts, finds that there are three prevalent rationales that 
courts have invoked for these requirements. These include (1) the 
ability of candidates to understand the problem and needs of their 
constituencies; (2) the need for voters to have adequate time to assess 
the candidacies of the persons running for office; and (3) to prevent 
political carpet-bagging.328 Professor Pitts only weighs the justifica-
tions given for residency requirements for candidates. As we saw, the 
courts have considered the wisdom of residency requirements for vot-
ers, too. But let us begin our examination of the justification for du-
rational residency requirements by briefly looking at some of the ra-
tionales that Professor Pitts has found for candidates.  
 The first rationale for upholding durational residency require-
ments has to do with ensuring that candidates understand the needs 
and problems of their constituents. The assumption is that a candi-
date who lives in the district for a longer period of time will be more 
knowledgeable about that district’s issues and its constituents’ needs. 
“The purpose of residency statutes,” a court in Missouri explained, “is 
to ensure that governmental officials are sufficiently connected to 
their constituents to serve them with sensitivity and understand-
ing.”329 Other courts have determined that candidates should have 
the opportunity to “know the customs and mores of the people,”330 to 
“understand all the local problems,”331 and to “know the people of the 
community.”332 In short, durational qualifications allow a candidate 
                                                                                                                  
 327. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 2 (Alaska); CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 2.4(c) (Califor-
nia); DEL. CONST. art. II, § 3 (Delaware); HAWAII CONST. art. III, § 6 (Hawaii); TENN. 
CONST. art. II, § 9 (Tennessee); UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 5(1)(d) (Utah). 
 328. Pitts, supra note 3, at 346; see also, e.g., Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 
(D.N.H. 1974) (“The three principle state interests served by the durational residency re-
quirement are: first, to ensure that the candidate is familiar with his constituency; second, 
to ensure that the voters have been thoroughly exposed to the candidate; and third, to pre-
vent political carpet-bagging.”). 
 329. Lewis v. Gibbons, 80 S.W.3d 461, 466 (Mo. 2002). 
 330. State ex rel. Brown v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 545 N.E.2d 1256, 1259  
(Ohio 1989). 
 331. Bolanowski v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724, 730 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
 332. Id. 
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“the opportunity to become familiar with the issues and concerns that 
are important to the people he or she seeks to represent.”333 
 Separately, another rationale often invoked is that durational res-
idency requirements provide voters with more information about the 
candidate. Such requirements give voters, as the Alaska Supreme 
Court put it, “a period in which they may become familiar with the 
character, habits and reputation of candidates for political office.”334 
They “ensure that voters have time to develop a familiarity with the 
candidate.”335 The requirements provide voters the “the opportunity 
to become acquainted with the candidate’s ability, character, person-
ality, and reputation.”336 While this justification is about educating 
voters, it concerns the need for having a durational residency re-
quirement that restricts candidates. 
 Finally, a third reason that is often given for residency require-
ments is to prevent carpet-bagging. Following the Civil War, those 
from the North who moved to the South to take advantage of the  
unstable financial and political climate there were called “carpetbag-
gers.”337 The implication was that these were transient citizens  
who moved south with all of their possessions to take advantage of 
Southerners. A carpetbag referred to the form of luggage that these 
newcomers often carried; it was essentially a suitcase or satchel that 
was made out of carpet-like materials.338 The term has since been 
used pejoratively to describe political candidates who move to a new 
geographic region where they have no previous ties, and quickly seek 
to get elected to political office there.339 Candidate residency qualifi-
cations ostensibly protect communities from these types of people. As 
a federal district court in Michigan explained, durational residency 
qualifications serve citizens “in protecting [them] from ‘raiders’ who 
are not seriously committed to the interests of the community.”340 
 In addition to these justifications given by courts, Professor Pitts 
argues that there are two other justifications for candidate duration-
al residency requirements. The first of these is that these require-
                                                                                                                  
 333. Robertson v. Bartels, 150 F. Supp. 2d 691, 696 (D. N.J. 2001); see also Pitts, supra 
note 3, at 347 n.22 (citing Lewis, Summit Cty., Bolanowski, and Robertson for the proposi-
tion that residency requirements serve a government interest by guaranteeing that candi-
dates are familiar with the issues present in their district and among constituents). 
 334. Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Alaska 1974). 
 335. In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly, 40 
A.3d 684, 699 (N.J. 2012). 
 336. State ex rel. Brown v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections, 545 N.E.2d 1256, 1259  
(Ohio 1989). 
 337. See RICHARD NELSON CURRENT, THOSE TERRIBLE CARPETBAGGERS, at xi (1988). 
 338. Id.  
 339. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-
1877, at 294-96 (1988). 
 340. Joseph v. City of Birmingham, 510 F. Supp. 1319, 1337 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
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ments help lower the number of candidates in any given election by 
keeping “frivolous” candidates off the ballot.341 Variations on the 
same theme have often appeared in other forms, including justifica-
tions that durational residency requirements also prevent “ballot 
crowding” and prevent an election from becoming too “unwieldy.”342 
Separately, another justification that Professor Pitts finds for dura-
tional residency requirements is that they work to ensure geographic 
representation. The requirement that a person has to live in a certain 
geographic region of a state for a set period of time may work to bet-
ter ensure that the region’s needs and character receive adequate 
representation in the state’s legislature.343 
B.   Scholarly Reactions 
 The scholarly community has long been strongly opposed to dura-
tional residency requirements. As Professor Pitts states emphatical-
ly, “Residency requirements should be eliminated.”344 He contends 
that durational residency qualifications neither hold up under close 
scrutiny, nor do the reasons for them seem to be empirically justi-
fied.345 Several of the reasons that courts have given for these re-
quirements are concerned with the need to protect the interests  
of voters.346 Yet Professor Pitts and others argue that voters are not 
ignorant. They are perfectly capable of making good choices, and a 
candidate’s lack of connection to a local community is something that 
voters should quickly understand and be able to judge for them-
selves.347 If a candidate is new to a legislative district or a candidate’s 
home is located outside the geographic region from which he is seek-
ing election, this is a matter that voters should be able to detect and 
weigh in proper perspective on their own.348 
 Of course, whether Professor Pitts is correct on this point  
is open to debate. Much of the literature on the “political ignorance” 
of voters posits that one of the problems with modern democracy  
is precisely that most of the public is usually ignorant of politics and 
government.349 Many people know that their votes are unlikely  
                                                                                                                  
 341. Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Alaska 1974). 
 342. See Pitts, supra note 3, at 359.  
 343. Id. at 360. 
 344. Id. at 342. 
 345. Id. at 356 & n.46, 378-79 & n.118. 
 346. Id. at 363. 
 347. Id. at 363-64.  
 348. Id. at 364. 
 349. See generally, e.g., ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY 
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013) (making the argument that one of the biggest 
problems with modern democracy is that most of the public is usually ignorant of politics 
and government); see also Dmitry Bam, Voter Ignorance and Judicial Elections, 102 KY. 
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to change the outcome of an election and thus do not see a benefit  
in educating themselves about political candidates, much less taking 
time out of their day to vote.350 Some scholars have argued that while 
this may be rational, it creates a nation of people with little political 
knowledge and little ability to judge good policies for themselves.351 
To be fair to Pitts, his arguments only apply to durational residency 
requirements as they affect candidates. As Pitts explains, “My argu-
ment and perspective is that, at least in relation to residency, voters 
will likely get sufficient information [to] be able to process that in-
formation adequately.”352 In his view, durational residency require-
ments limit freedom of choice, limit competition, and limit the ideas 
and perspectives among which voters are able to choose.353  
 Gavin Dow points to other serious problems with durational resi-
dency requirements. One is that they force courts to get involved in 
ordinary politics. They often place courts in situations where the 
court has to make a decision quickly.354 Courts that are faced with a 
durational residency challenge on the eve of an election do not have 
much information or good precedent on which to base their decisions, 
and they risk damaging their reputations and legitimacy when they 
are forced to resolve heated election contests.355 Other scholars have 
also argued that durational residency requirements should be 
deemed constitutionally suspect, because they impinge on fundamen-
tal rights that deserve the judiciary’s protection, including the right 
of an individual to vote, the freedom to travel, and perhaps even the 
First Amendment right of freedom of political association.356 
                                                                                                                  
L.J. 553, 555 (2013) (arguing that “the voters [are] ignorant of judicial decisions and misled 
by deceptive television advertising, [they] are unable to hold [judicial candidates or] judges 
accountable for erroneous decisions, clear bias, or even unethical conduct”); Christopher S. 
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 350. See SOMIN, supra note 349, at 5 (positing that “[a]n individual voter has little in-
centive to learn about politics because there is only an infinitesimal chance that his or her 
well-informed vote will actually affect electoral outcomes”). 
 351. See, e.g., BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES 
CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007); cf. Alan S. Gerber et al., Why People Vote: Estimating the 
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 352. Pitts, supra note 3, at 367 (emphasis added). 
 353. Id. at 370-71. 
 354. Dow, supra note 227, at 1535. 
 355. Id. at 1537. 
 356. See LeClercq, supra note 3, at 914. 
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C.   Democratic Underpinnings 
 Despite what other scholars have written, I believe that duration-
al residency requirements are not uniformly irrelevant, and one could 
make the case that they have legitimate democratic underpinnings. 
In terms of democratic theory, durational residency requirements are 
not as perplexing as some scholars make them out to be. But before 
advancing this argument, we first have to return to the distinction 
between the two different kinds of durational residency requirements 
that this Article has highlighted. First, durational residency  
requirements have been applied to voters. Second, they have been 
applied to political candidates. Our framers were well aware of this 
important distinction, and it surfaced during their debates. Unfortu-
nately, scholars have often collapsed this distinction when criticizing 
the justifications for these requirements. 
 Durational residency requirements for voters are difficult to justi-
fy in a democracy like the United States that is characterized by  
a high degree of mobility. In the 1970s, both Congress and the federal 
courts began to understand this and, as a result, severely curtailed 
durational residency requirements for voters. But importantly, dura-
tional residency requirements were not eliminated entirely. Short 
durational residency periods were still needed for administrative 
purposes, for instance. A state has to know who its voters are in  
order to run elections effectively, and it takes time to register new 
voters. Durational residency requirements for voters ensure that 
elections may be run smoothly. Such durational residency require-
ments are often functionally interchangeable with modern voter  
registration deadlines. In both cases, the requirements are designed  
to give states adequate time to sign people up to vote. Yet another 
justification for having short durational residency requirements for 
voters is to prevent voter fraud. Beyond these reasons, it is hard to 
see why durational residency requirements for voters need to exist. 
 The situation for candidates, however, is different. Some scholars 
believe that imposing durational residency restrictions on office-
seekers is unnecessary if the purpose of an election is to permit a ma-
jority of voters to select a candidate who is the most qualified indi-
vidual for the job. If voters are able judge for themselves who the best 
candidate to represent them is, they will place appropriate weight on 
the candidate’s attributes that are relevant for the job, including the 
fact that the candidate may be from somewhere else. In this sense, 
durational residency requirements should be seen as being antidemo-
cratic, the argument goes, because they could block the election of the 
candidate who would otherwise be the majority’s choice.357  
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 However, this view of the matter does not take into account other 
aspects of democratic theory, for durational residency requirements 
could also themselves be viewed as a legitimate exercise of popular 
will.358 When durational residency requirements are enacted by dem-
ocratically-elected legislatures, their existence reflects a democratic 
judgment made by the people in the first place.359 There is merit in 
respecting the wishes of the people, as articulated through the legis-
lative process. From one of democracy’s other vantage points, there-
fore, durational residency requirements may be legitimate. This is 
especially so when these requirements are enshrined in a democrati-
cally framed constitution. 
 There is yet another vantage point from which durational residen-
cy requirements can be justified in democratic theory. These re-
quirements play an important role in democracy precisely because 
modern democratic practice involves electing representatives from 
distinct and diverse legislative districts. Those who oppose durational 
residency requirements often engage in what Professor Gardner  
describes as “a kind of democratic reductionism that equates democ-
racy with raw, nationwide majoritarianism.”360 But most democracies 
do not work this way.361 Because we live in a country comprised of 
different electoral districts, majoritarian sentiment cannot be trans-
lated perfectly into legislative representation.362 In some cases, our 
legislative districts correspond with the boundaries of our states, 
which elect our Senators. In some cases, they consist of congressional 
districts within the states. Usually, these districts differ significantly 
from one another, not only in terms of their distinct populations but 
also in terms of other values and attributes. Reasonable durational 
residency requirements for candidates help to protect the interests of 
these districts and help steer both state and national legislative poli-
tics in the direction of championing local issues. 
 The framers understood that some qualifications had to be placed 
on candidates for office, and they created qualifications that ensured 
capable and loyal men would serve in Congress. No person could be a 
Representative unless he had “attained to the Age of twenty five 
Years,”363 had “been seven Years a Citizen of the United States,”364 
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and “when elected, [was] an Inhabitant of that State in which he 
shall be chosen.”365 Similarly, no person could be a Senator unless he 
had “attained to the Age of thirty Years,” had “been nine Years a Cit-
izen of the United States,” and “when elected, [was] an Inhabitant of 
that State for which he shall be chosen.”366 And if voters found the 
best political candidate for a House seat happened to be twenty-four, 
or the best candidate for a Senate seat happened to be twenty-nine, 
would the Constitution prevent these younger candidates from being 
elected? The answer is yes, it would.  
 Like these requirements, durational residency requirements serve 
an important purpose. Our democracy is constructed out of geograph-
ic regions. Senators represent the people of their states, and Con-
gressmen represent the people of their districts. There is something 
so basically intuitive about forcing a district’s representative to re-
side in the district that he or she represents that even the framers 
understood it. They did not want states to be represented by wealthy 
interests from neighboring states, and they were fearful of reproduc-
ing the “rotten borough” system that had developed in Britain. 
Though the framers ultimately did not include a durational residency 
qualification for members of the House and Senate, they did include 
one for the President, who had to reside in the United States for four-
teen years prior to his election. And the framers were cognizant of 
the durational residency requirements that existed in the states. 
These qualifications allowed the states to maintain their distinct, in-
dividual, and often unique identities.  
 Reasonable durational residency qualifications for both voters and 
candidates are required for modern democracy. “While it’s impossible 
to prove residency requirements provide absolutely zero benefit in 
every situation,” Professor Pitts writes, “it seems likely that situa-
tions where residency requirements clearly benefit the electorate are 
outliers.”367 Professor Pitts’s argument goes too far, and this Article 
disagrees with this assessment. Where voting is concerned, reasona-
ble durational residency requirements are necessary for administra-
tive efficiency. Where political candidates are concerned, durational 
residency requirements work to ensure that local interests are 
prized. In some states today, durational residency requirements may 
be too long, but it cannot be said that such requirements, to the ex-
tent they are reasonable, contravene democracy entirely.  
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The best way to understand durational residency requirements is 
to view them as a part of American history. These requirements were 
around at the time of the colonies and their merits were debated at 
the Constitutional Convention. The framers’ debates resulted in a 
mixed blessing: they voted against imposing durational residency re-
quirements on candidates for the House and Senate, while they al-
lowed these requirements to continue to flourish in the states. That 
compromise was perhaps expected, given that the delegates could not 
agree among themselves on how the Constitution should regulate the 
right to vote. For a number of the delegates, voting was understood to 
be a state matter and that is how they preferred to leave it.  
 Lengthy durational residency requirements for voters were main-
tained by the states for nearly two hundred years. The increasing 
mobility of American society following the Second World War, to-
gether with the increasing consciousness concerning voting rights of 
the 1960s, eventually put durational residency requirements on Con-
gress’s agenda. Congress limited the amount of time that the states 
had to register voters for presidential elections to thirty days, and the 
states began to follow suit by limiting the registration and durational 
residency periods for their state election contests. The Supreme 
Court helped the states along when it held in Dunn v. Blumstein that 
onerous state durational residency requirements violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. Once again, the states had to conform, and one by 
one, they shortened the length of these requirements for voters.  
 The history of candidate requirements turned out differently. The 
federal government had no reason to infringe upon the election of 
state officials, and no constitutional basis for doing so. When candi-
dates have challenged durational residency requirements for infring-
ing upon their own equal protection rights, federal courts have 
turned these challenges away.368 They have likewise turned away 
challenges brought under the theory that candidate durational resi-
dency requirements impinge on the rights of voters.369 Over time, two 
different systems would develop regarding durational requirements 
for candidates seeking public office. Federal candidates had no dura-
                                                                                                                  
 368. See, e.g., Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (1974) (concluding that “the 
State has a compelling inteerst [sic] to impose durational residency requirements upon 
those who seek state-elective office and that such an imposition does not constitutionally 
interfere with plaintiff’s right to interstate travel”).  
 369. Id. (“[Plaintiffs] allege that the durational residency requirement infringes upon 
three constitutional rights: first, the right to vote for the candidate of their choice; second, 
the right to associate for the advancement of their political beliefs; and third, the right to 
interstate travel. Their contention that the residency requirement adversely affects their 
right to associate and travel interstate is without merit. . . . The compelling state interest 
in prescribing eligibility requirements [for candidates] clearly outweighs the minimal inter-
ference with their right to cast an effective vote.”). 
2016]  RESIDENCY AND DEMOCRACY 677 
 
tional residency requirement to meet. Thus Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. 
and Hillary Clinton could run for Senate in New York while being 
residents of another state. On the other hand, the states maintained 
lengthy durational residency restrictions for their governors and leg-
islators, not to mention their mayors and city council members.  
 Durational requirements are not necessarily antithetical to de-
mocracy, and they have been a part of American constitutional histo-
ry for as long as that great experiment has lasted. The preferred and 
most effective way of gaining access to public office in a democratic 
society is the ballot box. When durational residency requirements for 
public office interfere substantially with the right of the people to 
vote for the candidates of their choice, they should be seen as being 
incompatible with a democratic government and inconsistent with 
the equal protection of its laws. But reasonable durational residency 
restrictions serve many important purposes. They promote a sense of 
democratic community and ensure that candidates are cognizant of 
local issues. They also help preserve the distinctions and characteris-
tics of different legislative districts. Diversity in legislative districts 
is a phenomenon found in the legislature of almost every state. When 
the people choose who will govern them, they choose a representative 
who has demonstrated a commitment to their community and to 
their legislative district. In practice, our political communities are 
split into bounded geographic districts. These geographic districts 
elect politicians to serve in legislatures, which ultimately govern the 
greater country of which the district forms a part. Our geographically 
bounded political communities should have the power to determine, 
within reason, the candidates whom their people elect. Durational 
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